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ABSTRACT 
AMERICAN PROPAGANDA, POPULAR MEDIA, AND THE FALL OF  




Zachary C. Fisher 
 
Dr. Joseph A. Fry, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 In June 1954, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala resigned in the face 
of a coup led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. While the United States publicly denied 
involvement, the coup was in fact the culmination of a plan called PBSUCCESS (CIA 
codeword), led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although PBSUCCESS lived 
up to its namesake, it was aided (both intentionally and unintentionally) by various U.S. 
media outlets. For the duration of Arbenz Guzman’s regime, he and his country had been 
the subject of U.S. suspicions of undue Communist and Soviet influence. A general anti-
Communist attitude permeated virtually all of the period’s journalism and governmental 
deliberations on Guatemala, leading to regular instances of sensationalism, exaggeration, 
and unjust accusations of Communist influence. In addition to a number of secondary 
sources and declassified CIA records, this paper examines the reporting of the New York 
Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Time, Life, The New Republic, and The 
Nation. An analysis of these sources’ perspectives will ascertain the nature of 
government-media relations, and their effect in building momentum for/implementing 
PBSUCCESS. There was no massive government-media conspiracy at work, but 
mutually supporting governmental and journalistic biases sealed Arbenz Guzman’s fate. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
GUATEMALA AS THE FIRST DOMINO 
  
 Following the conclusion of World War II, the United States faced an 
increasingly bipolar world. Brought together by the Nazi threat, the U.S. and USSR's 
marriage of convenience rapidly deteriorated following the defeat of Germany, Italy, and 
Japan. The two nations soon contested territories and formed opposing alliances, from 
NATO in the West to the Warsaw Pact in the East. Mutual fear and suspicion grew 
quickly, highlighted by the threat of nuclear warfare. In such a tense environment, small 
threats loomed large and differing opinions became intractable problems. Soviet Premier 
Joseph Stalin saw capitalist movements in Europe with the same skepticism as U.S. 
President Harry Truman viewed socialist rumblings in Latin America. The division of 
occupied Germany and Berlin, in which the two competing alliances shared a border, 
only exacerbated these tensions. 
 Guatemala was the first location in which American suspicion in the Western 
Hemisphere turned into active regime change, as the United States financed and 
supported Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who ousted the democratically elected 
President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954. By overthrowing a democratically elected 
government in the name of anti-communism, the United States established a precedent of 
direct intervention against left-leaning or socialist/Communist leaders to guard against a 
perceived threat from the USSR. American policymakers especially feared that such 
leaders would be Soviet puppets and allow Russian weapons and basing privileges only a 
few hundred miles from American borders. Arbenz Guzman appears to have had no 
intention of doing that, yet he was overthrown because of American fears that he might 
	  	   2	  
have eventually compromised U.S. security. To launch an intervention against such a 
small nation in the absence of a direct, concrete threat to the United States required a 
heightened fear of Communism on the part of both the government and the American 
people. That fear and the accompanying desire to actively counter it were shared in 
varying degrees by US media outlets. US policymakers were keenly aware of the media's 
role in shaping public opinion, and its subsequent effects on achieving popular backing 
for the government's anti-Communist initiatives.  
 This paper will examine key print media outlets' coverage of United States’ 
foreign policy in Guatemala, with a focus on the tenure and overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman. The fundamental purpose will be to ascertain the degree to which those outlets 
supported the U.S government's evolving stance on Arbenz Guzman. An examination of 
the government's efforts to control media messaging and a comparison to the print 
medias’ position casts light on the effects of such efforts in Arbenz Guzman's removal. 
Put more simply, was the media an active aide to the government's plans? Was the media 
vulnerable to the same anti-Communist fears that drove policymakers, and did the media 
wittingly encourage the American public to adopt the U.S. governments’ anti-
Communist, anti-Arbenz Guzman position? 
 Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was the first Latin American leader who was displaced 
because of American fears of Soviet infiltration. He rose to power in a fairly conventional 
fashion, as an army officer who participated in the 1944 overthrow of the autocrat Jorge 
Ubico Castaneda, who resigned under pressure from popular protests. Juan Jose Arevalo, 
an exiled college professor, then won the 1944 presidential election and assumed power. 
Although many of his fellow revolutionaries believed that corporations, particularly the 
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United Fruit Company (UFCO), were to blame for Guatemala's low standard of living, 
Jose Arevalo imposed only modest regulatory measures directed at the UFCO. The army, 
however, considered Jose Arevalo too reformist, and attempted nearly thirty coups during 
his six-year tenure.1  
  Arbenz Guzman ran for president in 1950 on a platform of economic reforms and 
a need to replace the "old system," in which a handful of companies and rich landowners 
controlled the bulk of Guatemalan wealth. Although his opponent, former general Miguel 
Ydigoras Fuentes, criticized Arbenz Guzman as Communist agent, the State Department 
regarded Arbenz Guzman as "realistic" and the US charge in the Guatemala embassy saw 
his attitude toward UFCO as "devoid of prejudices." The White House and CIA were 
more ambivalent after Arbenz Guzman's 3-to-1 trouncing of Ydigoras Fuentes, but 
believed he was more conservative and more pro-business than Jose Arevalo.2  
 Arbenz Guzman's administration maintained a policy of non-alignment in foreign 
affairs, but made several high-profile statements and actions that heightened US 
suspicions of his Soviet sympathies. First, he publicly withdrew his predecessor’s offer to 
supply troops in support of the Korean War, a conflict heavily criticized by Guatemala's 
government newspaper, Diario de Centro America. Diario also repeatedly cited 
Czechoslovakia as a model of socialist worker society. More significantly, Guatemala 
was the only Latin American nation to support a UN resolution by the Soviet Union 
requesting the admission of The People’s Republic of China into the organization. When 
Stalin died in 1953, the Guatemalan Congress, observed a moment of silence in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1999), 96-97. 
2 Ibid., 100 (quote)-101. 
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honor; again, the only Latin American nation to do so. The largely symbolic nature of the 
UN vote and moment of silence suggested that Arbenz Guzman did to a certain extent 
sympathize with Communist ideology. As the leader of a nation with a history of 
corporate exploitation and high levels of income disparity, Arbenz Guzman felt a degree 
of kinship with the USSR, but wanted to achieve progressive change slowly so as to 
gradually build a broader power base and avoid inviting US ire.3 
 Arbenz Guzman surprised Department of State and CIA analysts when he moved 
further to the left in 1952 with Decree 900, which stipulated a framework for agrarian 
land reform: "Decree 900 announced that uncultivated land on estates greater than 224 
acres was subject to expropriation. Landowners were to be compensated with long-term 
bonds for the land taken."4 Although the reforms affected a maximum of .5 percent of all 
private estates,5 Decree 900 proved to be the beginning of Arbenz Guzman's undoing, as 
it spurred the US to create a plan for his removal. The Eisenhower administration 
privately believed the decree appealed to the Guatemalan peasantry as a long-overdue 
measure, but opposed it nonetheless.6 Within the CIA from 1952-53, assessments of 
Arbenz Guzman began to describe an active threat to the United States as opposed to a 
simple opportunist.7 
 In addition to its effects on the United States, Decree 900 served to unite Arbenz 
Guzman's opposition, composed of traditionally anti-Communist groups within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2008),10. 
4 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 105. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Stephen M. Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Center for International Studies, 2000), 19. 
7 Marth L. Cottam, Images & Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 40. 
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church, business community, and army. Arbenz Guzman's association with known 
Communist leader Victor Manuel Gutierrez caused concern even among Guatemalan 
liberals.8 The United States also received dire warnings from neighboring right-wing 
Central American dictators (including Juan Manuel Galvez of Honduras, Oscar Osorio of 
El Salvador, and Anastasio Somoza Garcia of the Dominican Republic) about 
Guatemala's apparent leftward lurch. Although Truman left office without intervening, 
Eisenhower moved more aggressively.  
 Truman was not ideologically opposed to intervention, but did adhere more 
closely to the non-intervention feature of President Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor 
Policy in Latin America. Eisenhower criticized Truman’s less engaged approach during 
his 1952 presidential campaign, and promised change. The clearest public expression of 
this change came during the 1953 Organization of the American States (OAS) conference 
in Caracas, Venezuela. Latin American delegations entered the conference hoping for 
U.S. recognition of their grievances; among their concerns was confirming the principle 
of U.S. non-intervention in Latin America. Guatemala’s Forign Minister, Guillermo 
Toriello, challenged John Foster Dulles’ argument for the “Caracas Resolution:” that 
Communist influence in the region would be cause for U.S. action. Dulles coaxed, 
cajoled, and threatened other nations’ representatives to rally support for the resolution. 
In the end, Guatemala cast the only ‘no’ vote, and the United States achieved a veneer of 
legitimacy for its future action in Guatemala.9 
 Aside from the obvious party distinction, Eisenhower was also more enamored of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 117. 9	  Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 
1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 274-76.	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covert operations. As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Eisenhower was impressed 
with the exploits of the CIA's forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).10 By 
1953, the CIA could also point to an operational success, when it engineered regime 
change in Iran, removing the nationalist leader Mohammed Mossadeq and replacing him 
with Shah Reza Pahlavi.  
 Eisenhower found a similarly willing partner in Castillo Armas. A former army 
officer, Castillo Armas had fled Guatemala in 1951 after leading a failed assault on a 
Guatemala City army base, being wounded in the battle, and finally escaping from his 
prison cell that June. In November 1951, he met with U.S. officials in Panama, and 
maintained contact through his ultimately successful coup in June 1954.11 
 Eisenhower and the U.S. government maintained that they were forced to act 
because the Guatemalan government had been taken over by Communists and their 
poisonous ideology; indeed, it was the only issue that mattered. According to Stephen G. 
Rabe, the planners of PBSUCCESS "interpreted inter-American affairs solely within the 
context of the global struggle with the Soviet Union."12 The State Department regarded 
Arbenz Guzman's predecessor, Jose Arevalo, as an "extreme leftist rather than a 
Communist," but the CIA was more concerned over his Communist sympathies, warning 
that he was "a potential threat to U.S. security interests."13 To the United States, Jose 
Arevalo's potential Communist energy became more kinetic after Arbenz Guzman's 
election.  After three months in office, the State Department reported that "the ascending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2000), 147. 
11 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 98, 124. 
12 Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889, 142. 
13 Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, 13. 
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curve of Communist influence has…continued upward on an accelerated incline," and the 
CIA also grew more skeptical.14 Although their concerns about Arbenz Guzman's 
political inclination were justified, the CIA's own estimates only counted 1,000 members 
of the Guatemalan Communist Party.15 
 After the fact, John Dulles admitted to the Brazilian Ambassador on May 11, 
1954, that it would be "impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan 
Government to Moscow; that the decision must be a political one and based on our deep 
conviction that such a tie must exist." Nonetheless, plans proceeded apace under the 
assumption that if Arbenz Guzman did not present an immediate threat, he would become 
more dangerous over time. This sentiment meshed with the overarching anti-Communist 
agenda of the Eisenhower administration; in 1953 and 1954, anticommunism was the 
defining feature of Eisenhower's Latin American policies.16 By fall 1953, the United 
States had begun planning in earnest for Arbenz Guzman's removal.  
 From January to fall 1953, U.S. assessments of the situation in Guatemala grew 
increasingly dire. In February 1953, CIA Director Allen Dulles described the situation as 
an "approaching crisis"; and, in April, John Moors Cabot (Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs) met with Arbenz Guzman and reported that the Guatemalan 
president had “obviously sold out to the Communists." A number of reports and 
intelligence estimates continued in that vein throughout the summer and early fall. In a 
telling example of the hyperbole and paranoia that pervaded U.S. conceptions of 
communism, an August National Security Council (NSC) assessment concluded that not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 14. 
15 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 126. 
16 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1988), 57 (quote), 59. 
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intervening would be "suicidal." Alarmist language aside, many US analysts knew that 
there was no hard, physical evidence linking Arbenz Guzman to Moscow, but that fact 
was essentially irrelevant. In another example of the US government's reflexive fear of 
anything resembling socialism or communism, a State Department (DoS) report admitted 
that evidence of an Arbenz Guzman-Soviet partnership was "largely circumstantial," yet 
went on to assert that "it is abundantly clear that what has happened in Guatemala is a 
part of Moscow's global strategy."17 
 In addition to the geopolitical perspective, domestic political implications 
influenced Eisenhower. He maintained a good relationship with the press, occasionally 
playing golf and cooking for its members. Although he did not expect loyal subservience, 
“…he considered reporters to be quasi-members of his staff.”18 In his 1952 campaign, he 
promised to provide strong leadership and be tougher on Communism than the 
Democrats. Instead of relying on Truman's containment policy, Eisenhower promised to 
retake the initiative and roll back Soviet influence. Despite the firm rhetoric, Eisenhower 
was attacked from the right wing of the Republican Party for appeasement following the 
1953 Korean armistice, as well as for being insufficiently aggressive in dismantling 
Roosevelt and Truman's expansive social programs. The political pressure grew so great 
that by the summer of 1953, Eisenhower was driven "almost to despair of being able to 
succeed in the presidency," and saw the benefit in achieving a foreign policy triumph to 
appease his critics. From Eisenhower's standpoint, U.S. international credibility, his 
personal leadership and credibility, and his prospects for a successful term (domestically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, 17. 
18 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume Two: The President (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1984), 53. 
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as well as internationally) demanded that he remove Arbenz Guzman.19 Furthermore, 
Eisenhower genuinely believed that Arbenz Guzman was either a Communist or 
controlled by them. This conviction caused him to ignore State Department skeptics and 
proceed with the operation.20 
 PBSUCCESS was not designed as a simple military invasion. U.S. strategists 
feared that a direct U.S. military intervention would damage the country's credibility in 
Latin America and, therefore, opted for a covert intervention.21 The operation sought to 
alienate the Guatemalan army from the Arbenz Guzman government. The CIA planned a 
combination of restrictions on arms and materiel imports, followed by an intensive 
propaganda campaign; it was hoped that these actions would convince the army that 
supporting Arbenz Guzman was a fool's errand.22 The CIA took extra precautions in the 
form of bribery, authorizing $10,000 a month for payoffs to Guatemalan officials.23 The 
CIA actually attempted to bribe Arbenz Guzman to leave, but was turned down.24 Arbenz 
Guzman recognized the U.S.’s efforts to discredit him, and attempted to reassure the 
military leadership, eventually resorting to importing a shipment of Soviet arms when the 
United States refused to fill his orders.25 The United States then seized upon news of the 
May shipment as evidence that Arbenz Guzman was in fact a Soviet agent, even though 
the CIA missed the initial shipment. U.S. government reaction was swift and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, 25. 
20 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume Two: The President, 192. 
21 Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, 20 
22 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 129. 
23 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 
97. 
24 William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II 
(Monroe, LA: Common Courage Press, 1995), 77. 
25 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 132. 
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exaggerated; although the arms were no more advanced than conventional howitzers and 
machine guns (many were outdated and rusty), Speaker of the House John McCormick 
(D-MA) referred to the shipment as an "atomic bomb" and Ambassador Peurifoy called 
for direct intervention. On May 24, 1954, U.S. Navy ships blockaded Guatemala.26 
 On June 6, Arbenz Guzman heard about a broadcast over the Guatemalan state 
radio station from a retired head of his air force issuing a (heavily CIA-edited) call for 
revolution. The CIA had been using the same frequency since mid-May, when the state 
station went down for an antenna change. Arbenz Guzman panicked, arresting or killing 
hundreds of suspected subversives. His rash response only encouraged the CIA's 
propaganda efforts. Castillo Armas invaded from Honduras on June 18 with a force of 
less than a thousand men, termed by CIA agent Richard Bissell as an "Extremely small 
and ill-trained" group.27 His assessment was correct, as Castillo Armas's offensive was 
quickly snuffed out by a combination of police, military units, and dockworkers. 
Desperate to revive the stalled invasion, President Eisenhower authorized a secret 
deployment of three CIA-piloted aircraft, which proceeded to bomb and strafe a variety 
of targets, including a Christian missionary radio station, a British freighter, and 
Guatemala City's largest military parade ground. Although the CIA's false broadcasts 
continued, they failed to spark the populace into revolt.28  
 Despite suffering defeats on the battlefield, the army and populace were convinced 
that allowing Arbenz Guzman to remain in power would lead to destructive conflict with 
the United States. Arbenz Guzman also recognized that reality and resigned his office on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 98. 27	  Ibid., 96 (quote), 99. 
28 Ibid., 100. 
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June 27,29 ceding power to Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, who pledged to fight Castillo 
Armas' forces. CIA officer (and former Time Magazine Berlin bureau chief) Enno 
Hobbing subsequently convinced Colonel Enrique Diaz that resistance was hopeless; 
after a series of military juntas, Castillo Armas took power in late August, and was feted 
at the White House shortly thereafter.30 
 PBSUCCESS succeeded in part due to the effectiveness of its propaganda on the 
Guatemalan people, but the operation also required a base of domestic U.S. political 
support for anti-Communist measures. There has been no thorough study of the 
government's efforts to stimulate popular support for the operation, or of the U.S. print 
media’s involvement. By studying several mainstream media outlets in conjunction with 
the efforts of prominent government officials and agencies, the complex relationship 
among media, government, and the public during Arbenz Guzman's fall will be clarified. 









 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 133. 
30 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 103. 
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     CHAPTER 2 
ALL TOGETHER NOW: U.S. COLD WAR ATTITUDES 
 
 The clear anti-Communist bias of U.S. media outlets during the 1950s and 
overwhelming anti-Communist public sentiment invited the possibility of purposeful 
governmental propaganda efforts. To be sure, the government was aware of the 
importance of press outlets in shaping public opinion, and sought to control public 
perceptions of government policies. After examining a significant sampling of 
mainstream press coverage as well as internal government documents, there is no 
evidence of a concerted propaganda campaign.31 Government analysts became more 
concerned over time about Arbenz Guzman’s politics. A similar pattern prevailed in 
mainstream media outlets, but there is little basis for accusing the government of causing 
the press to become more nervous about the issue. The CIA mentioned open source 
articles internally as part of its information-gathering process, revealing incidental, not 
purposeful coordination. That said, government figures did have the opportunity to 
generate news themselves, putting the burden on the media to analyze the validity of their 
opinions. Whenever a high-level government official expressed concern about Arbenz 
Guzman or Guatemala’s reliability, news organizations covered it. If they could not 
definitively disprove it, the story or truth effectively became the statements of the official 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Media sources were selected based on several criteria, designed to capture an accurate 
sampling of media perspectives: geographic distribution (sources from New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles), differing political ideologies (conservative, moderate, and 
liberal), and circulation figures to indicate which publications had larger readerships, and 
subsequently provided clues as to the mindset of their readers.	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in question. This situation was frequently the case, and left journalists captive to their 
sources. Even in June 1954, at the height of interest in Guatemala, New York Herald-
Tribune reporter Homer Bigart noted that many journalists assigned to be on the ground 
reporters preferred to cover events from the Hotel Prado in Guatemala City, breaking 
away only occasionally to be escorted around by rebel fighters and representatives.32 
 It must be remembered that journalists were people of their time. In a country 
where fear of Communism ran rampant, it should not be surprising that journalists may 
have held anti-Communist biases that overpowered the ethics of their profession. Nothing 
in the materials discussed here indicates that journalists acted against their own attitudes 
or perceptions in reporting Guatemalan events. It was the truth as they saw it. Neither 
government nor the media operated in a vacuum, and each was aware of the other. There 
were unethical ties and relationships, but again, the collective governmental and media 
bias that brought down Arbenz Guzman arose from a confluence of factors.  
 Before World War II, few Americans seriously considered an organized 
government effort to influence foreign nations and peoples, except during a national 
emergency. After the shock and horror of World War I, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States sought ways to extend their power through informational, non-violent 
means. A combination of U.S. government propaganda, private groups, and media outlets 
helped to establish the consensus view that the United States had to lead worldwide 
opposition to Communism.33 It is indicative of the anti-Communist hysteria of the time 
that Harry Truman believed the Soviet Union would not initiate war with the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Betsy Wade, Forward Positions: The War Correspondence of Homer Bigart 
(Fayetteville, AR: The University of Arkansas Press, 1992), 156. 
33 Ibid. 
	  	   14	  
States, lacked the infrastructure and resources to maintain such a conflict, and yet did not 
employ those opinions in an effort to reduce public alarm over the Soviet Union.34 
 Even while World War II raged, Communism and Soviet power were at best 
tolerated in the United States. Many U.S. officials privately hoped that the Russians and 
Germans would destroy each other, thereby relieving America of two enemies at once. 
U.S. laws restricted Communist as well as Nazi organizations under the Smith Act of 
1940. After the war, the Smith Act was challenged in 1948 and argued before the 
Supreme Court. Truman’s Justice Department contended that the Bill of Rights was never 
intended to be “a hiding place for enemies of the state.” The U.S. government won the 
case, upholding the convictions of eleven Communist activists. In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Hugo Black considered the American public’s general attitude towards 
Communism: “Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the convictions of 
these Communist petitioners.”35  
 The U.S. government took full advantage of that consensus with the passage of 
the January 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, which authorized the formation of the United States’ 
first formal, global propaganda program. After the act passed, the DoS’s budget for 
information operations doubled to $31.2 million and the U.S. message became more 
blunt, as Voice of America (VOA) broadcasters were instructed to openly and explicitly 
“point the accusing finger at the Russians.” The DOS’s budget jumped again to $115 
million in 1952, as part of Truman’s “Campaign of Truth”, which had sprung from the 
Smith-Mundt Act’s global aspirations. One VOA official later recalled that “anything 
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more subtle than a bludgeon was considered ‘soft on communism.’”36 The program was 
in fact designed to judge the veracity of information by its source alone. In essence, if the 
United States said it, it was true, and if the Russians said it, it was false. Mainstream 
media sources generally supported of the plan; the New York Times did its part by 
engaging in a supportive PR campaign.37 
 Truman’s truth campaign also co-opted private media outlets. The Office of War 
Information (OWI) leased transmitters from CBS and NBC and hired journalists to 
conduct its propaganda operations. Those journalists eventually returned to private media 
employment, effectively creating a group of loyal propaganda employees in the private 
sector. The Associated Press (AP) and United Press (UP) also supplied scripts to be used 
in OWI broadcasts, and the U.S government subsidized the overseas distribution of 
various publications, including Life, Time, and Newsweek. All of these actions furthered 
the Truman administrations’ belief that news and propaganda went hand in hand.38 
 There was indeed something to fear from Stalin’s brand of Communism. His 
government executed many dissenters, sent thousands more to Siberian gulags, and 
starved millions of its own people. The United States, however, reacted far more strongly 
against a far weaker domestic Communist presence than its wartime European allies. 
Communist parties thrived in France and Italy without overtaking their host governments, 
and Winston Churchill refused to establish a British equivalent of the U.S.’s House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC). In 1950, the United States, population of 150 
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million, contained a Communist Party of 30,000; the same number of members that were 
counted in the American branch of the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church. While the 
Soviet Union was a threat to the United States, Communism was not a threat in the 
United States.39 
 Irrational fears of Communism in the United States maintained only a tenuous 
relationship with verifiable facts about the threat; actual knowledge could be (and was) 
filled with ominous assumptions and worst-case scenarios. With that framework in place, 
a wide range of panicky reactions and unwarranted fear and nervousness became the 
norm. By 1947, Life magazine had already declared the United States “Won the War and 
Lost the Peace.”40 This alleged loss, of course, came at the hands of the Soviet Union, 
which was presumed to be behind all worldwide Communist activity. The well-known 
pollster George Gallup encapsulated the nation’s wariness of Communism neatly: 
“Communist deeds are the exact opposite of its words.”41 This belief had profound 
consequences, as Eisenhower partially ignored a genuine opportunity for increased 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death, because the president 
believed that the sudden increase in peaceful Soviet overtures was not genuine. The 
National Security Council (NSC) also recognized a clear departure from Stalin’s tactics, 
but likewise assumed that the peaceful overtures were part of a “treacherous stratagem.”42 
 Truman’s administration agreed that Stalinist movements always masqueraded as 
nationalists, and subsequently wary of any nationalist uprising (Vietnam, for example). 	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The Korean War birthed the Domino Theory, which obligated the United States to 
combat Communism everywhere, at any time. This theory, in turn, sparked involvement 
in areas of the world that held little strategic value. Because no administration wanted to 
let the first domino fall and thus set off a destructive chain reaction, exaggerated threats 
and unnecessary panic became commonplace. By the 1960’s, the United States had 
military commitments to forty-seven nations and maintained hundreds of overseas 
bases.43 
 The public attitudes that encouraged anti-Communist information and reporting 
were striking in their virulence and popularity. A 1954 national poll revealed that 80 
percent of those polled wanted to revoke American Communists’ citizenship, 77 percent 
wanted Communists banned from the radio, 52 percent wanted to have all Communists 
jailed, and 42 percent believed no member of the press should be permitted to criticize 
the “American form of government.”44 Even after an increase in peaceful overtures from 
the Soviets following Stalin’s death, the American publics’ suspicion of Communism 
remained unchanged. “Of 1,116 articles discussing the Soviet Union in March and April 
1953, only fifty suggested that the United States might or should accept a ‘truce’ with 
Moscow.”45 The non-Communist American left was weakened as well; key labor leaders 
such as the AFL-CIO’s George Meany resembled their corporate lobbyist counterparts, 
and the Socialist Party candidate in the 1952 presidential election won fewer votes than 
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any of his predecessors.46 The specter of Communism also tinted other key areas of 
public life, with significant consequences. Many civil rights advocates and National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NACCP) activists were regarded as 
members of a Communist conspiracy, and Truman’s plan for national health insurance 
failed in part due to a claim from the American Medical Association (AMA) that the 
result would be a “monstrosity of Bolshevik bureaucracy.” These details, of course, came 
in addition to U.S. government loyalty tests, enemies’ lists, and the blacklisting of 
Hollywood entertainers. CBS was proactive in this regard, as it launched its own loyalty 
oath campaign to root out Reds, as it fired employees who refused to complete the 
questionnaire.47  
 In an environment and culture of such anti-Communist intensity, the print media 
exhibited blatant anti-Communist biases. Fear of Communist subversion enabled 
policymakers to calmly lie about U.S. government involvement in Guatemala, secure in 
the rationalization that the United States was the “good” actor in the end. U.S. officials 
also knew that instilling a certain degree of fear was useful for securing both domestic 
political backing and maintaining support for a costly national defense and foreign affairs 
strategy.48 
 Compared to the deep anti-Communist perspective that colored Cold War 
journalism, coverage of the Soviet Union during World War II was remarkable for its 
positivity and focus on Soviet sacrifice. Instead of an ideologically driven force, the 	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Soviet Union was represented in U.S. media as an institution embodied by the Red Army. 
A March and September-only sample of coverage in four publications (New York Herald 
Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle, Chicago Tribune, and Time) from 1944-1947 revealed 
a stark contrast in wartime and postwar coverage of the Soviet Union. The sample’s total 
figures for all publications involved indicated a 37.6 percent rate of positive news articles 
and editorials. However, after separating the information into mid-and post-war phases 
(May and September 1944-45, and in 1946-47), the differences became clear. In 1944-45, 
the rate of pro-Soviet articles was 72.5 percent of the 580 overall articles. In 1946-47, the 
rate of pro-Soviet articles dropped precipitously to 13 percent of the 822 overall articles. 
Some of the increase in overall articles was sparked by former Prime Minister’s famed 
“Iron Curtain” speech. The Chicago Tribune’s coverage in both phases ran strongly to the 
right, with only two of its fifty-two editorials in the sample being pro-Soviet. Even during 
the war, the Tribune viewed the Soviet Union in negative terms and refused to recognize 
it as a significant fighting force. Stalin and his state press did not help matters by making 
little effort to win over the American public and restricting U.S. journalists’ access to the 
Soviet Union.49  
 During World War II, the U.S. government and domestic press had a relatively 
cooperative relationship. The Office of Censorship's press wing was staffed by journalists 
on leave from their regular jobs, and the press routinely complied with government 
requests to withhold information.50 Understandably, many journalists regarded World 
War II as a kind of team effort, and reported as such.  	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 Following the war, the media assumed a more traditional, adversarial role. The 
government still attempted to control the information flow under the pretext of 
safeguarding America from Communist threats. In addition to institutional caution, the 
government itself was growing rapidly. The appearance of new bureaucracies and 
agencies caused a corresponding jump in the public relations field (a 1949 federal survey 
counted 45,000 public relations workers), and subsequently changed the ways in which 
journalists covered government sources. While the number of Washington 
correspondents increased, they were unable to thoroughly cover their rapidly expanding 
field of responsibility, causing some correspondents to complain that their 
contemporaries resorted to simply accepting government press releases in the interest of 
saving time. Because reporters were continually forced to deal with PR representatives 
instead of the actual officials and sources, US News and World Report publisher David 
Lawrence feared his reporters were increasingly subject to government manipulation, and 
that government propaganda was making its way into newspapers.51  
 In addition to fears of government propaganda seeping into daily newspapers' 
traditional reporting, the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the public consciousness 
presented newspaper publishers and editorial boards with another challenge. Many did 
not agree with his right wing opinions and largely baseless accusations of Communist 
infiltration of government and other institutions, but they felt obligated to reprint his 
statements because of his popularity. Other editors and reporters sympathized with his 
overall goal of ridding America of Communist influence. Unfortunately, when journalists 
reported McCarthy’s unproven accusations, anyone tainted by his charges was left with a 
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virtually ineradicable stigma.52 To both report the news and provide accompanying 
evidence and analysis, most newspapers turned to interpretive writing. That meant not 
taking a politician at his/her word. One of the primary advocates of the editorial was 
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times. The newspaper editorial, 
therefore, provides a clear window into that publication's institutional viewpoint. Put 
more simply by veteran reporter Louis Lyons: "If a politician distorts it, the 
newspaperman needs to straighten it out for the reader."53  
 The distortions Lyons referenced often arose from domestic political concerns of 
the politician that generated them. After the temporary unifying effect of World War II 
had ended, anti-Communism became the paramount concern. Only a year after the war 
had ended, the chairman of the Republican National Committee offered voters a choice 
between “Communism and Republicanism.”54 In the 1948 presidential election, the 
Republican Party regularly accused Truman of being “soft on Communism.” The 
administration, in turn, attempted to demonstrate its anti-Communist credentials.55 Even 
though Truman cared little for Senator Joe McCarthy, his administration backed 
McCarthy’s overall warning of Communist subversion. Truman’s attorney general, in 
phrasing that would have sounded comfortable in a McCarthy speech, alleged that 
Communists in America were “everywhere…undermining your government, plotting to 
destroy the liberties of every citizen.”56 Although Truman won re-election in 1948, his 
Vice President, Adlai Stevenson, lost to Dwight Eisenhower four years later. The 1952 
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election further validated communism as the predominant political issue in the United 
States. As Mao Tse-Tung’s Communist Party took power in China and with the outbreak 
of the Korean War, Dwight Eisenhower campaigned by running on a “crusade (against) 
Korea, Communism, and corruption.”57 Even Eisenhower’s crusade did not translate into 
political success for his Vice President, as Richard Nixon lost the 1960 presidential 
election to John F. Kennedy, who convinced the public that he would be more assertive 
in the fight against Communism than Eisenhower.58 The press covered both sides, 
thereby propagating the anti-Communist narrative. 
 No major media figure questioned the basic assumptions of the Cold War. 
Truman wanted to combat Soviet propaganda about the United States, and sought to 
enlist the entire country in the effort. He realized the impact of popular media, and 
explicitly appealed to editors for ideological support of the national security state. None 
of them blanched at the request.59 Although Truman was sometimes brusque with editors 
and publishers, he indulged many working reporters that he had come to know in public 
office. By June 1945, Truman had determined to take a firm line with the Soviets, and 
shared his intentions with several newsmen on a weekend fishing trip. Those present 
dutifully passed on the information to their superiors, including Henry Luce of Time, who 
was pleased that the course had been set.60 Truman’s defense secretary, James Forrestal, 
also realized the importance of PR, and hired three consecutive newsmen to the post of 
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assistant secretary of defense for administrative and public affairs, including one from the 
New York Times;61 an interesting selection, as Truman felt that the Times had been 
unfairly critical of his policies.62 
 President Eisenhower maintained a positive relationship with the media, but also 
distrusted the New York Times. Secretary Dulles called Times reporter Sydney Gruson a 
"dangerous character" who was following "the Communist line," and Eisenhower 
believed that "the New York Times was the most untrustworthy newspaper in the United 
States."63 Despite his skepticism of the Times, he chose a former Times reporter, Jim 
Hagerty, as his press secretary. Eisenhower seldom made a decision without running it by 
Hagerty to surmise how it would read in the next day’s papers.64 
 Eisenhower fully appreciated the value of public relations and propaganda from 
his experiences in World War II; he had “learned the importance of truth as a weapon in 
the midst of battle.”65 After barely a day in office, Eisenhower appointed C.D. Jackson as 
his Psychological Warfare Adviser. Before his stint with Eisenhower, Jackson was a part 
of Henry Luce’s media empire, overseeing the publication of Life and Fortune 
magazines. While serving under Eisenhower, Jackson passed dozens of tips and stories to 
his former (and future) employer that furthered the administration’s Cold War goals. 
Eisenhower could therefore count on the Time-Life conglomerate to support his 
initiatives.66 
 If Truman and Eisenhower did not particularly like the media and journalists 	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personally, they nonetheless understood the importance of public relations. Truman gave 
an average of three to four press conferences per month during his tenure, and was on 
familiar terms with reporters. Eisenhower was less enthusiastic, holding only fourteen 
press conferences during his first eight months in office.67 However, Eisenhower 
attempted to turn the advent of television news in his favor by allowing presidential press 
conferences to be televised starting in 1955. 68 He also worked to manipulate the press, 
by turns flattering the importance of their work, encouraging them to write supportive 
stories and threatening censorship if they strayed too far.69 
 Presidents were not the only ones who understood the importance of managing 
political opinions. Whereas commanders-in-chief could take their case directly to the 
public, the CIA took advantage of its secretive nature and often worked with political 
figures to advance a cooperative anti-Communist agenda. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-
WI), then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, readily acceded to the 
Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) request to publicize a Guatemalan arms 
shipment from the USSR in 1954. In addition to the CIA's ideological compatibility with 
some members of Congress, CIA Director Allen Dulles was not above “trying to get the 
jobs of newspapermen who criticize his agency."70 The latter was designed to block 
reporters' desire to dig too aggressively into the CIA's affairs. In general, most 
government agencies maintained a healthy amount of skepticism of the press. As one 
Truman-era State Department official put it: “…the press is looked on as a dangerous, 	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unattractive beast, which you can lead along for a little bit of the way, but which is likely 
to turn and bite you at the slightest opportunity.”71 
 The Department of State also played a key role in Arbenz's removal. The CIA 
took the most active role, but the DoS provided valuable diplomatic and political 
intelligence. As the United States’ premier foreign policy bureaucracy, the DoS was also 
in a position to shape public opinion. It sometimes resorted to outright falsehoods to 
exaggerate the Communist threat in Guatemala. In one example, DoS claimed that 
Guatemalan Communists had instigated a May 1954 banana workers' strike, when they in 
fact had raised only a few hundred dollars for the strikers' fund.72 Along with the DoS, 
the United States Information Agency (USIA) was responsible for creating and 
distributing pro-American information and propaganda. During the 1950s, the USIA 
spent $5.2 million on an anti-Communist campaign throughout Latin America.73  
 A comparison of the views examined in internal government documents with 
mainstream media reporting helps to clarify the extent of U.S. government propaganda 
efforts and effects on the press. The CIA was the operational agency in PBSUCCESS, 
which warrants a primary focus on its reports and discussions. The CIA has declassified 
and collected all of its PBSUCCESS-related documents on its website. In addition to that 
valuable source, I also consulted the State Department’s declassified Guatemala-related 
documents, included in the Foreign Relations of the United States. 
 The CIA’s concerns about Arbenz Guzman grew over time, mirroring the views 
their civilian counterparts. The media used government sources, and the CIA used 	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mainstream media reports to inform its own analysis. This relationship was somewhat 
incestuous, but largely unintentional. Of course, there were exceptions to the rule, but 
none so great as to significantly impact the broader course of events. The media and the 
government arrived at parallel positions by parallel means. The prime difference was that 
no voice of dissent existed within the CIA. Liberal publications such as The Nation or 
The New Republic were critical of the government’s actions in Guatemala, but there was 
no comparable CIA or DoS official registering an objection. 
  Despite the CIA’s skeptical attitude towards the media, it was often beaten to the 
punch on emerging stories, and incorporated open-source reporting for its own benefit. 
One example came in June 1952. A memorandum to the agency’s Western Hemisphere 
Division chief summarized a New York Times piece that reported on Anti-Communist 
disturbances in Guatemala. The author of the memorandum (name still classified) drily 
noted that “We have received no confirmation of the above reports from our own 
sources.”74 Declassified records also include several reports and remarks on TV programs 
and Walter Winchell radio broadcasts. Occasionally, the CIA appropriated open source 
reporting to reinforce its own propaganda. The importance of doing so was indicated in a 
May 1954 memorandum concerning a video from NBC-TV: “This material, if 
determined to be useful, is urgently needed, and it is therefore requested that you give 
this matter a high priority.”75 
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 As late as October 1952, the CIA was confident that Arbenz Guzman was not a 
Communist, stating that “he personally does not agree with the economic and political 
ideas of the Guatemalan or Soviet Communists.” The intelligence report also noted that 
Arbenz Guzman was aware of his country’s economic dependence on the United States, 
and even observed that his social reform ideas stemmed more from the “US New Deal 
than from Soviet Communism.”76 
 Internal government deliberations about the proper course of action in Guatemala 
took a turn with the appointment of John Peurifoy as the new ambassador to Guatemala 
in November 1953. By September 1, 1953, a CIA memorandum indicated that Peurifoy 
had been briefed, and embraced, the CIA’s intention to “take strong action against the 
government of President Arbenz Guzman in the hope of facilitating a change to a more 
democratically oriented regime.”77 Oddly enough, other reports noted that the desire for a 
more “democratic” government came more from the United States than Guatemalan 
citizens. A September 11 CIA memorandum exhibited the typical concerns about 
Communist infiltration, but also admitted that the government enjoyed considerable 
popular support: “no internal conditions (existed) that could be developed into a vital 
threat to the present Arbenz Guzman administration without determined support from the 
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outside.”78 Even though most Guatemalans were satisfied with their government, the US 
government’s desires mattered more than the Guatemalan peoples’.  
 In addition to addressing the supposed Communist threat itself, the CIA also saw 
the small country as a valuable proving ground for new tactics and techniques. To avoid 
proof of US involvement, money was funneled through Castillo Armas. To provide a 
broader rumor mill, the CIA developed “Intelligence and rumor nets…within Guatemala 
and in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras.”79 As operations progressed, the agency 
upped its level of support to match. Not content with mere broadcasts and rumors, the 
agency sent over 2 million propaganda items to Castillo Armas, including several tape 
recorders and mimeograph machines.80 
 PBSUCCESS began in earnest in November 1953. The draft memorandum for the 
operation laid out the CIA’s basic goals: to covertly remove Arbenz Guzman’s 
government, replace it with a pro-United States version, and to do so while maintaining 
plausible deniability. On this score, the CIA succeeded. During the coup, no mainstream 
media outlet accused the US government of direct or indirect intervention, only of tacit 
approval. The justification for PBSUCCESS was simple, but so general as to question the 
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rationale for intervention itself: “The Communists have become strongly entrenched in 
Guatemala and in the Guatemalan government, thus constituting a threat to United States 
welfare in the Western Hemisphere.”81 
 Another example of the CIA’s emphasis on media messaging came during the 
Alfhem incident. Internal meeting notes during that period reveal that the CIA had some 
foreknowledge of the shipment, but elected to wait until it had been completed to raise 
the alarm. In particular, the CIA sought to delay exposure until the period of time when it 
would be “most compromising to the Guatemalans.”82 CIA efforts paid off, as a report 
the following month described the Guatemalan army’s nervousness over receiving the 
arms. In particular, the military was concerned that the arms delivery would trigger U.S. 
involvement. The CIA was only too happy to encourage that apprehension, noting that it 
would attempt to “exploit uneasiness by rumor, black propaganda, etc.”83  
 During the coup, messaging and propaganda played a key role. The CIA even 
went so far as to author Castillo Castillo Armas’s introductory broadcast, which stressed 
religious and anti-Soviet themes. Of course, the speech emphasized the indigenous nature 
of the revolt: “This is not a foreign intervention, but an uprising of the honest, Christian, 	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freedom-loving people of Guat (sic) to liberate our homeland from the foreign 
intervention which has already taken place, from control by the Soviet Union which has 
made Guat (sic) and advanced outpost of international commie aggression, from rule by 
Soviet puppets.”84 
 Despite all the sound and fury over Soviet penetration of Guatemala, the actual 
evidence was scant. After the coup, Castillo Armas and the CIA scoured government 
records for evidence of Soviet influence. They were sorely disappointed. Both parties 
believed that the former administration had destroyed most of the incriminating records, 
which accounted for the lack of smoking guns. The CIA reported that of the 500,000 
documents it studied, only 2,095 were duplicated; the agency was forced to admit that, 
despite a cooperative Guatemalan press, “very few Communist damaging” documents 
were found. The likely cause is that few existed.85  
 Piero Gleijeses’s seminal work Shattered Hope documented the Soviets’ 
reluctance to aid Guatemalan Communists. No Arbenz Guzman official visited the Soviet 
Union, and only one PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, Guatemalan Communist 
Party) official landed in Russia during Arbenz’s tenure. Even that visit was only a short 
stopover enroute to the 1952 Asian and Pacific Peace Conference, and the official was 
only tolerated, not welcomed, by low-level Soviet officials. The Soviet Union was afraid 
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of appearing to open a beachhead in the hemisphere in a country of little strategic value, 
and also considered military officers in third world nations as imperialist stooges. On 
another occasion, the Soviets’ commercial attaché in Mexico visited Arbenz Guzman in 
Guatemala to discuss the purchase of bananas. No agreement materialized because 
Guatemala had no vessels to ship the fruit. After Stalin died in 1953, the Russians did 
begin to consider Guatemala as more fertile ground, but even then interest was minimal. 
The Kremlin did send copies of Pravda to Guatemala; presumably as a symbolic 
measure, as no Guatemalan Communist could read Russian. Guatemalan labor official 
Carlos Manuel Pellecer, who was the subject of a profile piece in Life, summed up the 
PGT-Soviet relationship neatly: “We were knocking on the door, but the Soviets didn’t 
answer.”86 
 Jules Dubois’ murky association with the CIA aside, declassified CIA documents 
mention only one journalist’s reporting: the New York Times’ Sidney Gruson. His name 
first appeared as a result of his article on December 23, 1953. In it, he wrote that some 
Latin American leaders were skeptical of the United States’ seeming double standard 
about governments in the region: dictatorships were tolerated, but Communists were not. 
After a fact-finding trip in the region, Gruson reported a “a fixed concern over the United 
States intentions in Latin America and an almost constant suspicion coloring reaction to 
anything Washington does or says regarding the area.”87 It should be noted that Gruson 
did not inject any obvious personal opinions on the topic. He reported only the 
impressions and beliefs he encountered on his tour. Nonetheless, the CIA was concerned 
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with Gruson’s reliability, despite a significant body of previous work that did not overtly 
criticize U.S. policy in the region, and in fact appeared to share the government’s 
suspicion of Communist influence in Guatemala.  
 Several weeks after the December 1953 article was published, the CIA’s Western 
Hemisphere Division wrote a memo to its chief detailing its concerns. The memo 
discussed another newsman’s association with Mr. Gruson, which confirmed that the CIA 
used current and former journalists as sources. Unfortunately, the source of the 
memorandum is still classified, likely to conceal the CIA’s media contacts. The source 
gave a positive impression of Gruson’s professional abilities, and viewed the article in 
question as a well-meaning error. The CIA was less forgiving, as the memorandum 
recommended that “some consideration should be given to instituting an investigation of 
Mr. Gruson’s recent activities.”88 
 The agency’s fears were further inflamed when Gruson reported that the Alfhem 
shipment had united the Guatemalan people behind its government. After praising a 
recent Washington Post editorial that concurred with the CIA’s assessment of Guatemala 
as a potential Communist outpost, Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner turned his 
attention to Gruson: “Question again raised: What is Gruson motivation? We have 
suggested to ODACID (US Embassy) this matter be brought attention top hierarchy New 
York Times and would like suggest your consideration you have someone ask Gruson 
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what is his evidence.”89 Although Wisner signed the message, its ‘From’ line read 
Director, CIA. Suspicion of Gruson had reached the highest levels of the CIA. 
 The issue quickly snowballed. On May 27, the CIA produced a three-page  
assessment of on Gruson’s reporting. The report first discussed Gruson’s expulsion from 
Guatemala at the behest of Guillermo Toriello, Guatemala’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Toriello objected to by Gruson’s reporting and complained that he had exaggerated 
Communist influence in Guatemala. The CIA’s internal assessment of Gruson’s reporting 
found that he strove for objectivity, but approvingly reported that “In virtually every 
article referring to Guatemala Gruson characterized the country with some descriptive  
phrase mentioning Communist influence.”90 Evidently the CIA and Toriello Garrido 
agreed on this point. 
 In May 1954, Toriello Garrido invited Gruson to return to Guatemala, which he 
did. The CIA compared Gruson’s reporting with other foreign correspondents and judged 
his work was not particularly leftist or pro-Guatemalan. Interestingly, the agency opined 
that quoting Guatemalan official statements would indicate a definite bias on the part of 
the reporter; while the analysis did not state it explicitly, the corollary seemed to be that 
US statements were to be taken at face value. Nonetheless, the CIA believed that Gruson 
had made a deal with Toriello Garrido, “in which Gruson promised to bend over 
backward to give Guatemala and its Foreign Minister full and favorable treatment in his 	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reporting.”91 
 Evidently alarmed by this chain of events, Frank Wisner (writing on behalf of 
Allen Dules) cabled the CIA’s senior representative in Guatemala City that Gruson was 
possibly being used as a spy for the Arbenz Guzman regime. Wisner requested to be 
informed if and when Gruson left the country, and expressed his hope that he would be 
removed from the Guatemala beat, or something “possibly even more drastic.”92 
 The drumbeat of opinion against Gruson quickly grew louder. PBSUCCESS 
headquarters in Florida released a scathing memorandum on Gruson’s reporting only a 
week after the CIA’s more balanced analysis. The new assessment criticized Gruson’s 
articles: “their tone is definitely unfriendly to PBPRIME (United States) 
policies…Gruson has more or less accepted the official Guatemalan line with respect to 
the recent arms shipments…has habitually disregarded the opinions of independent 
papers and other news outlets in Guatemala…makes no attempts to present a balanced 
study of the views of different elements in the local society and business 
community…The net result is a biased report and a slanting of the news to fit a 
preconceived attitude….Gruson, himself, claimed to be a socialist.”93 The differences 
between the two analyses were remarkable. The same day, Frank Wisner wrote a 
memorandum to Allen Dulles concerning Gruson’s personal politics. Wisner asserted that 	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Gruson gave “distinct evidence of Marxist and pro-Communist sympathies…It is hoped 
that the TIMES will not see fit to post Gruson to any of the Latin American hot spots at 
any time in the near future.”94 Allen Dulles shared Wisner’s sentiments, and asked Arthur 
Hays Sulzberger (New York Times publisher) to remove Gruson from his current 
assignment, and Sulzberger obliged.95 There is scant evidence of the Dulles-Sulzberger 
relationship in the CIA’s declassified records: one veiled reference from Wisner, 
remarking on Dulles’ “friend on the Times,”96 (presumably Sulzberger given the 
suggestion to remove Gruson) and a personal memorandum from Dulles to Sulzberger 
referencing the passage of information “from a friend to a friend.”97 The CIA was 
encouraged by its success in removing Gruson from the Guatemala beat, and the agency 
often tried to recruit Times reporters to serve as covert informers, and passed false 
information to other reporters without taking responsibility as the source.98 
 Wisner’s next missive to Dulles contained another criticism of Gruson’s 
reporting, but more significantly mentioned the CIA’s own contribution to the 
mainstream media: “I believe you have already received by now a copy of the piece that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Central Intelligence Agency Historical Review Program, Memorandum For The 
Director of Central Intelligence.” Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1954. 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000928355/DOC_0000928355.pdf (accessed July 
12, 2011). 
95 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in 
Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 71-72. 
96 U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 
Retrospective Volume, Guatemala. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, 
Central Intelligence Agency to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles. Washington, 
D.C.: June 14, 1954. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d182 
(accessed July 11, 2011). 
97 Central Intelligence Agency Historical Review Program, Personal And Confidential 
Letter From Allen Dulles to Arthur Hays Sulzberger. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 1954. 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000924578/DOC_0000924578.pdf (accessed, July 
12, 2011). 
98 Reston, Deadline, 209. 
	  	   36	  
we have worked up and given to Time magazine, entitled The Friends of Guatemala.”99 A 
review of the Time archive does not show an article by that name, but the June 21 edition 
did contain an article discussing the growing unrest in Guatemala. Given the probable 
source, it was appropriately named: “Guatemala: Plots & Rumors.”100 
Time again pleased the agency with its cover story on June 28. Wisner reported “Time 
cover story this week excellent but almost unique job.”101 This is the only CIA record that 
explicitly confirmed the CIA directly feeding a story to a mainstream media outlet. The 
US Information Agency issued a post-mortem of their information operations after the 
coup, but did not explicitly mention similar actions.102 
 After the fact, Herbert Matthews of the New York Times accused two of his 
colleagues of being “God’s gift to the United Fruit Company…they unintentionally saw 
and wrote exactly what the State Department wanted to see.” Such inaccuracies and 
biases were not limited to the publications in this study. U.S. News and World Report 
repeatedly made blanket assertions of Communist influence without providing 
documentation to support their allegations. The Christian Science Monitor presented a 
more complex view of the situation, but uncritically printed alarmist predictions by US 
Congressmen; by the time the coup had begun, the Monitor had bought the government’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Ibid. 
100 Unknown Author, “Guatemala: Plots & Rumors,” Time, June 21, 1954. 
101 Central Intelligence Agency Historical Review Program, Memorandum from Director, 
CIA to (Unnamed). Washington, D.C.: June 27, 1954. 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000136982/DOC_0000136982.pdf (accessed July 
12, 2011). 
102 U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 
Retrospective Volume, Guatemala. Report On Actions Taken By The United States 
Information Agency. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 1954), 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d280 (accessed July 11, 
2011). 
	  	   37	  
line that Guatemala was under Communist control.103 Both Time and the New York Times 
wrote adulatory profiles of Allen Dulles.104 Unsurprisingly, CIA officials regarded Time  
and the New York Times as their most “active and rewarding relationships.”105  
 The CIA did not restrict their relationships to print outlets. Its relationship with 
CBS grew so close that CBS’s news president Sig Mickelson installed a private phone 
line to the CIA that bypassed the network’s switchboard; he had grown tired of using a 
pay phone to contact them.106 
  The causes and effects of biased reporting in the American press were varied and 
complex. The government and UFCO mounted active propaganda campaigns, which 
included planting and sourcing stories in the mainstream press; but, we must consider the 
practicalities of journalism. In the absence of contradictory evidence from Guatemalan 
sources, it was difficult to critically analyze UFCO statements, government opinions, and 
the howls of alarmist legislators. The news business entails covering the opinions of 
opinion-makers. When those opinions are almost uniformly of a certain view, it should 
come as no surprise that the coverage of those statements was slanted accordingly. 
Rumors operated in much the same way. When the CIA planted an unverifiable rumor, 
the media coverage itself lent the rumor a degree of certitude, as it could not be 
disproven. In addition, the CIA “had everything to gain by hyping the Red menace and 
much to lose should the suspicion take hold that the Russians might not actually pose 
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such a dire threat after all.”107 Essentially, the Soviet threat was the CIA’s raison d’etre, 
and the public was happy to oblige it. 
 In many ways, government and media analyses were simply products of the 
culture from which they sprung. Popular culture did not question the existence of a 
Communist threat, but merely questioned what form the threat would take.108 This 
assertion was borne out by polls of the time. In the mid 1950’s, Communism’s 
unfavorable ratings never dipped below 87.5 percent.109 
 Given the country’s anti-Communist mood, journalists may have found such 
information more credible since it reinforced widely held suspicions and stereotypes. 
Like most American citizens and officials, journalists agreed with the basic assumptions 
of the Cold War and rarely questioned the presuppositions of national security 
doctrine.110 In an insightful chapter on U.S. government-press relationships, Delmer 
Dunn noted that “Social psychologists generally hold that people frequently interpret 
information so that it agrees very closely with what they already think.”111 Richard 
Immerman described the concept of representative heuristics as it applied to Arbenz: 
“…people evaluate the extent to which the characteristics of a person…are representative 
of a category of that same object: Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz Guzman must be a 
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Communist. If it looks like a duck and acts like a duck, it is a duck.”112 In a similar vein, 
if the journalists themselves held reflexively anti-Communist views then they may have 
written the way they did regardless of the government’s efforts. Even if there had been a 
few newsmen of conscience that fought the government line, it is impossible to know 
their impact; the coup may have occurred regardless. But, there were no such journalists, 
and the print media served only to reinforce both the U.S. governments’ message and 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEDIA PERSPECTIVES ON JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMAN 
 
 Both before and after World War II, American newspapers generally reflected the 
widely-supported ideology of anti-Communism. In general, newspapers were fairly 
conservative institutions that supported the pro-business agendas of their owners; the 
Chicago Tribune was notably conservative, sometimes equating anti-New Dealers with 
anti-Communists.113 
 The field of popular media took on a new dimension in the 1950s. From 1952 to 
1957, the number of television stations increased from 108 to 544, and 78 percent of 
American homes had a television set. Newspapers seemed to benefit from television's 
rise, seeing a steady rise in overall circulation that peaked at 58,881,746 in 1960. 
Reflecting the demographic trend of city dwellers fleeing to the suburbs, major 
metropolitan dailies saw their share of overall circulation drop from two-thirds to one-
half of overall circulation by 1962. New weeklies and community dailies undercut the 
major papers. News magazines also fared well, with US News and World Report, 
Newsweek, and Time enjoying increased circulation. By 1956, Time's circulation had 
reached 2 million.114 
 Given Time’s extensive popularity, it is worth describing the politics behind it. 
Time and Life’s publisher, Henry Luce, was personally involved with his magazines.115 
Therefore, his personal opinions are instructive in analyzing Time/Life’s political stance. 	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Luce was, if nothing else, a believer in American leadership and primacy, writing (in 
Life) that the American people should “exert upon the world the full impact of our 
influence for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.”116 A 1956 
United Auto Workers (UAW) study concluded that Luce’s empire was effectively GOP-
biased. Unsurprisingly, Luce’s politics were generally conservative--a key detail given 
Time Inc’s status as the nation’s largest magazine publisher by 1963. Life, as indicated by 
its name and large photo spreads, was Time’s less somber sibling. It was also enormously 
successful, leading all magazines in advertising revenue by 1963 (Time was third).117  
 At the other end of the political spectrum, The Nation was, and continues to be, a 
key shaper and indicator of liberal thought. During the Guatemalan coup, it was the most 
reliable and skeptical source of the government’s claims about Arbenz Guzman, as well 
as the wisdom of removing him. Although several years too late for Guatemala, the 
magazine ran a critical expose on the CIA in 1961.118 
 Theodore Peterson described The New Republic as a magazine that “stood 
alongside The Nation as an organ of liberalism,” albeit a better-funded one. Its coverage 
of events in Guatemala bore out his conclusion, although its articles were slightly less 
skeptical than The Nation’s. By the mid-50s the magazine had staked out a position of 
moderate liberalism.119 
 The Los Angeles Times owner, Norman Chandler, bought into the Cold War 
wholeheartedly, even going so far as to offer one of his television stations to his friend 
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Louis Johnson, so Johnson might advance his employers’ agenda.120 At the time, Johnson 
was the Secretary of Defense. In general, the Los Angeles Times adopted a moderate 
political position, often copying foreign policy articles from the New York Times. 
 A period account of prominent newspapers’ foreign policy biases described the 
Chicago Tribune as such: “The American newspapers that are noted for their coverage of 
foreign affairs…are virtually all staunch defenders of a liberal internationalist foreign 
policy…The Chicago Tribune is the major exception to this generalization.”121 A 
midwest powerhouse, the paper’s circulation topped one million after World War II. It 
was unapologetically conservative, prompting Harry Truman to call it the “worst 
newspaper in the nation.”122 
 As the most prolific producer of Guatemala-related articles, the New York Times 
generated the bulk of primary source material; therefore, this paper devotes significant 
attention to analysis of those articles. Aside from the quantity of sheer content, the Times 
must be considered for its reputation. Mid-1950s contemporaries of the Times regarded it 
as the preeminent example of foreign policy reporting, the prime source for writers, 
politicians, and statesmen of the day. Its trickle-down effect was significant, as many 
papers with a less-robust foreign presence simply cribbed articles from the Times. 
Government officials held the Times in similarly high esteem, (quotes unattributed in 
source): “You can’t work in the State Department without the New York 
Times…everyone’s Bible of information…every man’s CIA around here…Foreign 
Service officers get to their desks early in the morning to read the New York Times, so 	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they can brief their bosses on what is going on.”123 
 The New York Times, as befitted its reputation, provided the most extensive 
coverage of the resources examined for this paper, and the vast majority of Jose 
Arevalo’s coverage in particular; by the time the Chicago Tribune first mentioned Jose 
Arevalo in 1947, the Times had already published nine articles pertaining at least 
indirectly to the Guatemalan leader. A ProQuest search of the New York Times, Los 
Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune from January 1, 1940 to Jan 1, 1960 yielded the 
following results: a keyword search for “Arevalo” returned 258, 90, and 75 results 
respectively. A keyword search for “Arbenz” returned 653, 175, and 150 results 
respectively. Again, the New York Times led in terms of sheer volume. Generally 
speaking, the aforementioned newspapers were suspicious of Jose Arevalo’s and Arbenz 
Guzman’s political leanings and commitment to democracy. While the Tribune tilted 
further to the right than the other two, fear of Communist influence in Guatemala 
permeated them all. 
 Jose Arevalo’s rise to power was not covered extensively, and therefore did not 
elicit the harsh skepticism that engulfed Arbenz Guzman. Jose Arevalo’s first appearance 
in the New York Times came on September 3, 1944. It was a brief article, mentioning then 
candidate Jose Arevalo as being  “supported by the Popular Liberator Front and the 
National Reform Party,” but with no discussion of leftist leanings124. During that 
December’s presidential election, the Times ran three articles, one each on December 19, 
20, and 22, discussing Jose Arevalo’s impressive margin of victory. Jose Arevalo tallied 
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256,514 votes against his nearest competitor’s 20,550.125 None of the articles mentioned 
Communism, leftism, or the possibility of electoral fraud. Although there is little 
evidence to suggest vote-rigging, the sheer size of Jose Arevalo’s victory would have 
made it easy for media outlets to cast aspersions on the results. The U.S. government was 
not wary of Jose Arevalo at that point, as the specter of international Communism had not 
yet taken hold. In addition, with World War II in full swing, the relative lack of coverage 
of Guatemalan events was not surprising.  
 World War II’s predominance aside, Jose Arevalo’s reforms raised little U.S. 
concern in and of themselves. Juan Jose Arevalo was a voluntary exile who was teaching 
in Argentina when the right-wing dictator Jorge Ubico Castaneda was overthrown. Ubico 
Castaneda had left behind a segregated government and justice system. Jose Arevalo’s 
common sense and inclusive reforms, therefore, were uncontroversial. Race and social 
groups lay at the heart of the matter. Ladinos, who possessed European ancestry and 
maintained modern lifestyles, were favored over the native Indians, who experienced 
political and criminal repression under Ubico Castaneda’s regime. Guatemala’s 1945 
constitution, with Jose Arevalo’s approval, granted suffrage to all Indian males, most of 
whom were illiterate; illiterate female Indians remained disenfranchised. Jose Arevalo 
also enacted a complex labor code in 1945, which gave workers the right to strike, 
bargain collectively, claim compensation for accidents, and earn a higher minimum 
wage.126 More controversially, Jose Arevalo enacted the “Law of Forced Rental” on 
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December 12, 1949, which enforced rental of uncultivated lands.127 However, the law 
required the request for land be made from the petitioner to the landowner, which greatly 
hindered the law’s implementation. Arbenz Guzman’s subsequent land reform efforts 
were much more sweeping and forceful, and thus raised larger protests. 
 Jose Arevalo’s reforms did not go entirely unchallenged. Conservative groups, 
including large landowners, foreign corporations, and many of the Landino elite in 
Guatemala City resented their loss of power and profits. As a result, Jose Arevalo had 
trouble financing his government and frequently claimed to discover plots against his 
administration, which enabled him to invoke public safety laws that stifled dissent.128 
Jose Arevalo dealt with Communists in a way that Arbenz Guzman would later mimic; 
Jose Arevalo viewed Communists as useful tools he could control but did not necessarily 
agree with.129 Ideologically, Jose Arevalo practiced “spiritual socialism,” but explicitly 
rejected Communism both in public pronouncements and in practice; the Communist 
Party was outlawed under his government.130 The United States was initially cordial 
toward Jose Arevalo, due in part to his willingness to accept foreign capital; by 1950, 
Guatemala was receiving $105.9 million dollars in foreign investment. The goodwill did 
not last long though, as Jose Arevalo bristled at U.S. Ambassador Richard C. Patterson’s 
direction that he fire seventeen Communists in his government.131 
 The first inkling of nervousness about Jose Arevalo came in a Times article on 	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June 9, 1945, expressing concern about the president’s appointments of personal friends 
to key government posts. The article did not discuss Jose Arevalo’s personal political 
leanings, but did include alarmist language: “The changes were viewed here as a 
symptom of an internal crisis that might have serious repercussions.” The article’s sub-
headline read “Honduran Paper Implies New President Is Not Democratic,” but the Times 
offered no editorial opinion, merely repeating the Honduran paper’s account.132 Jose 
Arevalo received only one reference in 1946; it criticized his restrictions on press and 
religious freedom. Three similar articles appeared in 1947.  
 Nineteen forty-seven was also the year that the Chicago Tribune submitted its 
first piece on the Communist threat in South America. Jules Dubois, the Tribune’s Latin 
American correspondent, exhibited a marked distaste for Communism and typically 
wrote about diplomatic developments with an urgency and aggressiveness unmatched by 
his counterparts in Los Angeles and New York. His first submission mentioning Jose 
Arevalo appeared in his June 16, 1947 article on rifts between Latin American Socialists 
and Communists. While offering no evidence, Dubois wrote that “There is no 
international socialist liaison with socialist parties in Mexico or with the Central 
American and Caribbean republics, except Guatemala.”133 The implication of 
international connections was important, as US officials particularly feared the Soviets 
using Latin American nations to establish a toehold in the region. That fear would color 
dozens of media reports and articles about Guatemala throughout the next decade. Dubois 
also asserted that Jose Arevalo condoned Communism, but stopped short of accusing 
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Jose Arevalo of personally adhering to the ideology.134 
 Dubois held his fire throughout 1948, and the New York Times ran only three 
articles about Jose Arevalo during the year. All three articles dealt with supposed 
Guatemalan plots to undermine its neighbor, Nicaragua, which was under the control of 
the pro-American dictator Anastasio Somoza Garcia. Although the first article included a 
denial from Jose Arevalo, the following two merely published Somoza Garcia’s 
accusations without offering further context or evidence. Moreover, the wording of the 
articles’ headlines portrayed Guatemala as worthy of suspicion despite the lack of 
evidence in their attending articles: “Guatemala Plot Seen,”135 and “Somoza Sees Plot 
Against Nicaragua.”136 
 Jose Arevalo’s first significant mention in 1949 came in a salvo from Jules 
Dubois. The broadside was prompted by the July 18 assassination of army chief 
Francisco Javier Arana. A political rival of both Arbenz Guzman and Jose Arevalo, 
Javier Arana attempted a soft coup on July 16, demanding that Jose Arevalo dismiss his 
cabinet (including Arbenz Guzman) in favor of Javier Arana’s handpicked replacements. 
Javier Arana then would have occupied a favorable position for the 1950 presidential 
election. Jose Arevalo asked for time to comply with Javier Aranas’ ultimatum, but 
worked behind the scenes to deport the general. Apparently unconcerned with the 
possibility of resistance or betrayal, Javier Arana informed Jose Arevalo on July 18 that 
he was traveling to secure a small weapons cache. On the return trip, Javier Arana was 
shot and killed in a gunfight. Jose Arevalo did in fact order his forces to capture Javier 	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Arana, but the identity of the assailants and the nature of the gunfight remain a 
mystery.137 The effect on one of Javier Arana’s subordinates, however, was less 
ambiguous. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas would carry out his coup with greater caution. 
 From Dubois’ perspective, this was a blatant act of politically motivated murder 
by Jose Arevalo and Arbenz Guzman. If Dubois had any knowledge of the political 
conflicts preceding Javier Arana’s killing, he did not include any of those details in his 
August 8 article.  Under the headline “Dictator Drops An Iron Curtain On Guatemala: 
Seeks to Spread Red Revolution,” Dubois launched a number of incendiary charges at 
Jose Arevalo and his government, including multiple references to a Guatemalan-Soviet 
connection and an unsubstantiated plan to spread Communism throughout the region. 
Dubois twice asserted that Jose Arevalo was “determined to spread a Communist 
revolution thruout (sic) the western hemisphere,” and that Jose Arevalo and Arbenz 
Guzman were “trying to convert Guatemala into a soviet satellite.”138 His charges were 
exaggerated, but the fears that begat them would be repeated.  
 Guatemala attracted further U.S. attention in October 1949, but not for political 
reasons. The country was struck by floods that killed several hundred civilians; still, even 
a topic as seemingly innocuous as flood relief became a point of contention. The New 
York Times ran an article detailing the disaster, as well as President Truman’s instruction 
to offer “all possible aid,”139 but took no political position on the issue. The Chicago 
Tribune, however, criticized Truman’s position, asserting the Guatemalan government 
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had exaggerated the flood’s effects to gain more development aid and enhance its 
domestic political position. The editorial’s headline was less nuanced: “Taxing 
Americans To Spread Socialism.”140 Regardless of the actual extent of the damage, the 
editorial board argued that it would be foolish to “assist socialist governments dedicated 
to destroying free enterprise. There is no reason for such expenditures in Guatemala, 
whose government and economic actions have little effect on the American economy.”141  
 The New York Times did run an article concerning Jose Arevalo on July 18, but it 
dealt with Guatemalan support of U.S. involvement in the Korean War. Anxious to 
assuage U.S. concerns about his involvement with the USSR, Jose Arevalo insisted that 
“no political tie whatsoever existed with the Soviet Union.”142 The Times did not question 
the assertion, but printed a skeptical piece eleven days later titled “Guatemalan Reds Said 
To Attend Cabinet.”143 
 Nineteen fifty marked a notable increase in media coverage of Guatemala, 
primarily due to that year’s presidential election. President Jose Arevalo, constitutionally 
prevented from seeking another term, was on his way out. Arbenz Guzman was 
considered the candidate to beat from the beginning, owing to his military experience, his 
role in the 1944 coup that ousted Jorge Ubico Castaneda, and his association with Jose 
Arevalo’s government. He was also an avowed liberal with designs on land 
redistribution, which caused concern in the U.S. media and government.  
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 The New York Times first sounded the alarm on February 21, 1950. Using a report 
from the Guatemalan newspaper Hora detailing the labor unions’ decision to back 
Arbenz, the Times agreed with Hora’s fear that Guatemala was headed for a “dictatorship 
of the proletariat.” The Times predicted a government that would be “more Socialist than 
Communist, but following the latter in international relations.” Issuing a warning that 
would become more frequent throughout the decade, the Times cautioned its readers that 
the Communists would appear “not as Communists, but as labor leaders and selfless 
saviors of the working classes.”144 
 Jules Dubois picked up the theme a few months later and linked Guatemala to the 
Soviet Union, writing that Guatemala was “on the verge of becoming a totalitarian 
dictatorship of the Moscow type.”145 This was a key distinction. By tying Guatemala to 
the USSR (again without providing evidence), Dubois raised the stakes of the debate. 
Dubois did not accuse Arbenz Guzman of being a Communist, but asserted that he was 
“known to be sympathetic to the Communists.”146 
 Dubois was not the only one homing in on alleged Soviet infiltration in the 
Americas. In June 1950, the New York Times’ Will Lissner released the first of a six part 
series on “Soviet penetration in Central America and on the economic and political 
relations of that area.” Significantly, it was the first front-page article on Guatemala 
among any of the publications discussed in this paper. Such a prominently placed article 
carried with it an intimidating headline: “Soviet Agents Plotting To Ruin Unity, Defenses 
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Of Americas.” The sub-headline charged that the Soviets were planning to use Guatemala 
as a base for operations in the region, and declared that the Guatemalan Communist Party 
functioned as an arm of the Soviet Information Bureau. Lissner identified the Guatemalan 
Communists’ guiding principles as “terror and organization,” and went on to discuss their 
personal traits. Confusingly, he ridiculed the Communists’ goon squads as “…callow 
youth…who could not survive a day’s battle in a New York or Chicago slum,” but then 
singled out a group of them that “…more closely resembled New York mobsters.”147 In 
this manner, Lissner encouraged his readers to mock the Communist enforcers as 
weaklings, yet at the same time fear their rough looks and tactics. Though starkly 
different, both examples engender a view of the Communists as an evil “other,” whether 
weak and sneaky or strong and fearsome. It was at this point that the Los Angeles Times 
began reporting on Guatemala, although in this instance only by re-printing Lissner’s 
article on June 25, 1950.  
 Lissner’s second installment came the following day, June 23. He again focused 
on Soviet efforts to establish a presence in the western hemisphere. In his second 
consecutive front-page article, he detailed the process by which the Soviets sought to 
accomplish their goal. He identified five slogans that would be used as covers for Soviet 
penetration, warning that they would appear as “…nothing more than a good liberal 
program.” Lissner also referred to the “Communist-supported” Arbenz Guzman, and 
charged that Moscow was attempting to put Guatemala “…squarely in the Soviet 
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camp.”148 However, it should be noted that the Times carried a story on page 3 that same 
day, covering an Jose Arevalo meeting with US Senator Ralph Brewster with the 
headline “Reds Few in Guatemala, Arevalo Tells Brewster.”149 As with the first 
installment, the Los Angeles Times carried Lissner’s story several days later, albeit on 
page eighteen.  
 Lissner did not mention Jose Arevalo or Arbenz Guzman in the third, fourth or 
fifth installments, and featured an interview with Jose Arevalo in the sixth. Lissner 
admitted that hard evidence about Communist penetration in Latin America, such as 
names and pictures of their agents, was lacking. He explained this by citing “inadequate 
support and underestimation of the seriousness of Communist intentions in Washington,” 
rather than the absence of actual evidence.150 Nonetheless, excerpts from his interview 
with Jose Arevalo were generally uncritical, with Jose Arevalo claiming distaste for the 
Communists. The Times ran a similarly uncritical article on July 18, with Jose Arevalo 
denying the existence of any political contacts with the Soviet Union.  
 Despite Jose Arevalo’s testimonials, both the Times and the Tribune kept up the 
drumbeat of Soviet influence. The Times ran a headline on July 29 alleging Communist 
influence in the Guatemalan cabinet. Jules Dubois released a more aggressive report on 
August 1 under the headline “Guatemala Red Terror Bared For First Time.” He accused 
Jose Arevalo’s government of moving yet another step “toward the dictatorship of the 
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proletariat.”151 
 Jose Arevalo’s supposed march toward proletarian dictatorship ended in 
November 1950, when he adhered to his country’s constitution and did not seek another 
term as president. Faced with the prospect of a possibly more powerful liberal leader in 
Arbenz Guzman, the Tribune began to treat Jose Arevalo with a gentler tone. As 
presidential voting opened in mid-November, the Tribune wrote that Jose Arevalo had 
“raised living standards, improved schools, hospitals and roads, and gave workers their 
first protective laws.”152 The Los Angeles Times also ran an article without accusing 
Arbenz Guzman of those sins, but did label Jose Arevalo’s regime “leftist” the following 
day.153 The New York Times ran a more detailed article about the Communist question in 
Guatemala, but maintained a balanced view, noting that “The Communist Party, as a 
political organization, is prohibited in Guatemala, but some observers maintain that it has 
helped more than it has hindered the operations of a clandestine party.”154 
 Arbenz Guzman did command significant popularity, and won by a sizable 
majority of 266,778 votes out of 416,187 cast.155 The New York Times noted Arbenz 
Guzman’s wide margin of victory, as well as the opposition’s accusation that he was 
aided by fraudulent and plural voting. Specifically, the piece described the ink used to 
mark voters’ fingers as faulty, easily reproducible ballots, and truckloads of voters told to 	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vote for Arbenz Guzman.156 Unlike many previous articles, the evidence originated from 
the Times’ on the ground correspondent, as opposed to unnamed sources or unproven 
opinions.  
 Like Jose Arevalo, Arbenz Guzman initially received comparatively little 
coverage following his inauguration. Aside from an article covering his inauguration in 
March and an article featuring a labor union leader praising Arbenz Guzman in May 
(both appearing only in the New York Times), none of the three newspapers found much 
decisive to report. As Arbenz Guzman entered his third month as president, some 
reporters began to doubt his ability to control Communists in his country, regardless of 
his personal inclinations. 
 C.H. Calhoun of the New York Times was the first to write a substantive critique 
of Arbenz Guzman’s behavior toward Communists in his country. In addition to 
Communist activists, Calhoun blamed the dictatorial Ubico Castaneda regime and feudal 
planters for creating conditions ripe for Communist intrusion. He also noted that “the 
demands the workers are making and the things they are doing to employers are perhaps 
little worse than the things that the workers suffered during the period that ended with the 
overthrow of the dictatorship of the late General Ubico Castaneda.” Despite these 
caveats, he still alleged that the Communists had increased their power “at an alarming 
rate” under Arbenz Guzman.157  
 Several days later, Calhoun’s employer introduced a new metaphor for 
Communist influence in Guatemala in an editorial entitled “The Guatemalan Cancer,” 	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which again discussed the possibility of Guatemala being used as a Soviet front. Using 
Calhoun’s June 5 article as its primary reference, the editorial alleged that Communists 
and Communist sympathizers had seized control of the Guatemalan Congress and labor 
unions. Although the editorial board tempered its charges by mentioning Guatemala’s 
lack of military threat to the United States, it also cautioned that the real threat came from 
Guatemala’s example, not its size: “The chief danger is its influence on other Central 
American countries…and what happens in Guatemala is going to be echoed for good or 
ill from Cape Horn to the Rio Grande,” the editorial claimed in a restating of the domino 
theory.158 
 The Times’ editorial board re-emphasized its concerns the next month, this time 
under the headlined “Communists In Guatemala.” It optimistically reported only small 
anti-Communist demonstrations while fretting about a Guatemalan labor party event 
which featured large portraits of Lenin and Stalin. The article again mentioned 
Guatemala’s regional importance, but surprisingly stated “We cannot suppress 
communism there.” The editorial suggested using the power of example and persuasion 
instead of coercion.159 For the first time, a major newspaper had pre-emptively ruled out 
U.S. intervention in Guatemala, and the country was not mentioned again in a significant 
way until that fall. 
 The concern over Guatemalan officials’ presence at Communist-sponsored events 
received new emphasis that November, when Arbenz Guzman and other high-level 
officials did not respond to invitations to attend an anti-Communist rally. The article 
drew an explicit comparison between this rally and the leftist labor conference event in 	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July. The author did not mention if the leaders in question had legitimate scheduling 
conflicts, but such a distinction was absent from the headline: “Guatemala Leaders Shun 
Anti-Red Rally.”160 
 The U.S. media had become increasingly wary of Arbenz Guzman’s true political 
goals since his inauguration. Aside from the aforementioned symbolic events, he had not 
promoted a legislative program that caused great American concern. That all changed 
when he embarked upon his ambitious land-reform program (Decree 900), which sought 
to appropriate land from wealthy plantation owners and Western corporations (the United 
Fruit Company in particular) and divide it more equally among the Guatemalan citizenry. 
Specifically, the plan called for the division and distribution to as many peasants as 
possible of idle land on properties with more than 223 acres.161 The merits of the program 
notwithstanding, it did spark greater interest from the U.S. press. Indeed, many believed 
that Decree 900 revealed Arbenz Guzman’s true colors. 
 Before Decree 900 was enacted in June 1952, the Guatemalan government 
negotiated with the United Fruit Company (UFCO) regarding its tax obligations and 
wage scales. UFCO agreed to wage guarantees and the government’s demands in order to 
maintain their profitable monopoly on the nation’s banana industry. The New York Times 
saw a shadowy third party involved in the negotiations in the form of Soviet agents 
(Headline: “A Test For The Cominform”). Without providing evidence, the Times 
reporter asserted that the Soviets had chosen Guatemala as a proving ground for its anti-
American program: “It can be anticipated that a battalion of strategically placed 	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Communist agents will now seek to disrupt the negotiations.”162 The author did not 
accuse the Guatemalan government of outright Socialism or Communism, but charging it 
with being a Soviet puppet sent the same message. The next Times article about the land 
reform effort carried a similarly suggestive headline: “United Fruit Opposed: Red-Led 
Guatemalan Unions Back President’s Program.” Repeating the subtle implications of 
Guatemalan-Soviet ties, the author mentioned Guatemalan Congressman Victor 
Gutierrez’s recent trip to Moscow.163 
 The Times briefly broke from its string of alarmist reports on March 29. Herbert 
Matthews submitted a page 4 article entitled “Guatemalan Reds Are Strong But They 
Don’t Run Country.” Matthews acknowledged the arguments in support of a rapidly 
growing Communist threat, and proceeded to make his case that such concerns were 
overblown: “the Communists hold no top positions in the government…are not well 
organized; they are amateurish…There is infinitely more personal ambition than 
Communist ideology behind the political developments in Guatemala.” Instead of 
labeling Arbenz Guzman a Communist in waiting, Matthews described him as a 
relatively weak leader, albeit one surrounded by a wise group of advisers. Finally, the 
author argued that “success is likelier to be achieved by patience and understanding than 
by vilification or reprisals.”164 This article proved to be only a brief respite; the next 
Times piece concerning Arbenz ran under the headline “Guatemalans See Red Theme.”165 
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 As Decree 900 moved closer to implementation, the Times and other outlets 
began to examine its effects more closely. Sydney Gruson wrote the first detailed piece 
on the land reform plan, which reinvigorated fears of Communist influence in Guatemala. 
The headline left little doubt as to the contents of the piece: “Guatemala Plans Seizure Of 
Lands; Opponents View Bill to Take Farms From Owners as Step in Communization of 
Country.” Although Gruson did quote government officials, the most alarming details 
came from unnamed officials in the National Association of Agriculturists (NAA). The 
NAA represented the large landowners who stood to lose the most from Decree 900, and 
therefore had the most incentive to exaggerate the program’s effects, as well as the 
political ideology behind it. Those unnamed officials predicted economic chaos (which 
did not materialize), and warned Gruson that the decree was “a major step in the 
communization of the country.”166 
 Gruson expanded his argument four days later, detailing four instances of 
supposed Communist intrusion in Guatemala under the headline “Ideas Of Reds Held 
Ruling Guatemala; Ideologies Wear a Nationalist Cloak but Observers See a Kremlin 
Program.” Gruson did not view Arbenz Guzman as an active part of a Soviet plot, titling 
one of the articles’ paragraphs “Arbenz Himself not a Member.”167 That is not to say the 
author viewed Arbenz Guzman positively; even if Arbenz Guzman was not a Communist 
agent, the Kremlin could still manipulate him. 
 That same day, the Times’ editorial board published its opinion on Decree 900. 	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Surprisingly, it was largely sympathetic to the Guatemalan government. The board wrote 
that “Agrarian reform has been long overdue in Guatemala as in many Latin American 
countries. It is a recognized feature of our times that in promoting social justice there 
should be a relatively fair distribution of the land.” Even more surprisingly, the board 
correctly identified the reflexive anti-Communist nature of media coverage; however, the 
article did not mention the Times’ own indiscretions in this regard. The Times concluded 
perceptively that “There is always a tendency to label every move made in Guatemala as 
‘Communistic’…Meanwhile, it would be unfair to call attempts at agrarian reform 
Communistic in Guatemala, socialistic in England and democratic in Italy, just because 
of the complexion of the governments involved.”168 Despite this astute assessment, the 
first Times article following the decree’s enactment on June 16, 1952, described the 
program as “Communist-backed,” but did not characterize it as part of a broader 
Communist movement or plot.169  
 Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune had a much different take. In an article titled 
“Guatemala’s Regime On Road To Communism; Land Seizure Law Latest Pro-Red 
Move,” he accused Arbenz Guzman of personally leading Guatemala’s leftward 
procession. To be fair, Dubois did publish Arbenz Guzman’s denial that his land reform 
decree was a Communist program. Still, given the title of the article, there can be no 
doubt of the article’s intended effect upon the reader.170 
 As the company with the most to lose from the land reform bill, the UFCO  
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engaged in a public relations campaign of its own. It financed and disseminated a book to 
members of the U.S. congress and other key American opinion molders.  The book 
pointedly criticized the Guatemalan government as a “Moscow-directed Communist 
conspiracy.” UFCO also issued a weekly newsletter to 250 journalists; New York Times 
publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger himself received tips from UFCO PR chief Edward 
Bernays.171 The CIA was aware and approved of Bernays’ PR campaign; both the CIA 
and Bernays knew that the US press was vulnerable to the broadsides he lunched in 
conjunction with the State Department and other agencies.172 
 Decree 900 was evidently a perishable topic, as coverage fell off shortly after its 
implementation. The Los Angeles Times introduced a broad overview of Communist 
influence in Latin America two weeks after Decree 900’s passage without mentioning the 
program. The article did not include much specific information on Guatemala in 
particular, only mentioning its legal battles with UFCO and Arbenz Guzman’s “tendency 
to yield to Communist pressure.” Still, the article was intended to raise the readers’ 
awareness of the Communist threat through its headline: “Latin-American Communists—
They’re Few But Dangerous.” This type of headline had become common, but the 
article’s distinguishing feature was its graphic: an image of Latin America with a hammer 
and sickle superimposed over the map, along with a worker with his fist raised on the 
bottom right hand corner. Regardless of the text, the picture reinforced the notion of 
unseemly Soviet penetration of the continent. Another subtle warning came in its 
concluding quotation from an unnamed source: “The Communists are even now better 
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prepared to win Latin America than the Nazis ever were.”173 This reference did not mark 
a common comparison or trend of including the Nazi ideology as a scare tactic, but was 
the first instance of the word appearing in relationship to Latin American Communism, 
and yet another instance of exaggerating the Communist threat. 
 Guatemalan coverage fell off for the remainder of the summer, resuming in time 
for the 1953 Guatemalan congressional elections. Even then, the run-up only received 
two four-paragraph articles in the New York Times between July 1952 and January 1953. 
The stories were short, but the headlines were clear: “Guatemala Reds In Bloc,”174 and 
“Guatemalans Back Reds.”175 The former article did not include any strong accusations, 
but the latter published local observers’ views that Arbenz Guzman was trying to 
“strengthen the Communist position in this Central American republic.”176 
 The elections themselves received only slightly more coverage. C.H. Calhoun of 
the New York Times published the only in-depth piece, but focused mainly on the 
Communists’ campaign efforts, namely, “Shrill Communist Campaign Makes Name 
Anathema as 3-Day Tally Starts.”177 After the results were announced, a Times editorial 
analyzed the Guatemalan government’s new composition. Although two Communist 
candidates were defeated (which the editorial referenced as “bright spots,”) the make up 
of the Guatemalan government was essentially unchanged, with pro-government parties 
firmly in control of the congress. Overall, the editorial charged that “the Arbenz 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Russell Fitzgibbon, “Latin American Communists—They’re Few But Dangerous,” 
Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1952, B5. 
174 Associated Press, “Guatemala Reds In Bloc,” New York Times, October 8, 1952, 7. 
175 Associated Press, “Guatemalans Back Reds,” New York Times, December 31, 1952, 4. 
176 Ibid. 
177 C.H. Calhoun, “Anti-Reds Fearful In Guatemala Vote; Shrill Communist Campaign 
Makes Name Anathema as 3-Day Tally Starts,” New York Times, January 17, 1953, 4. 
	  	   62	  
government is still in partnership with the Reds.”178 
 The Los Angeles Times editorial board took a harsher stance than their east coast 
contemporaries. Their January 28 editorial included several common strands of anti-
Communist logic. The headline was sufficiently ominous: “Almost on Our Doorstep.” It 
employed the domino theory argument: “The pattern of the Communist revolution in 
Guatemala may well serve the revolutionists in the other hot republics;” this despite the 
fact that no mainstream media outlet or the Guatemalan leadership claimed that the 1944 
revolution was a Communist one. The Times also characterized Jose Arevalo as an 
“extreme leftist;” again, an unprecedented charge. The article did not accuse Arbenz 
Guzman of being a Communist, but noted he was “elected with Communist support.” It 
also made multiple references to Guatemala-USSR connections. The first dealt with an 
avowed Communist labor official, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, who had recently returned 
from Moscow. After he returned, “things began to happen,” the article intoned. The 
editorial’s conclusion contained the more blatant accusation, which predicted a 
Communist dictatorship and “A solid Moscow beachhead in the Americas seems about to 
be captured.”179 
 Several months later, Sydney Gruson stated that the beachhead was a reality. In 
perhaps the boldest headline on the topic, the Times led Gruson’s piece with the 
following title: “How Communists Won Control Of Guatemala: Country Presents Case 
History of Shift From a Dictatorship to Communism.” Interestingly, the article’s 
preamble said that Gruson had just returned from a trip to Guatemala and was presenting 
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a report on how Guatemala had swung from a dictatorship to a Communist-influenced 
government, not a Communist controlled one, as referenced in the headline. Gruson 
accused Arbenz Guzman of accepting Communist support, but not of being one. His 
conclusion was far more equivocal than the headline indicated: “it is now a question in 
Guatemala whether Arbenz Guzman uses the Communists for his ends or the 
Communists use him.”180 This article was yet another example of a dramatic headline 
overshadowing critical nuances contained within the accompanying column.  
 Two months later, Time made its first foray into Guatemalan coverage with a one-
page piece describing Guatemala’s May Day, under the headline “Guatemala: Reds In 
The Backyard.” Though the article criticized Arbenz Guzman as a “fanatical 
spokesman,” it repeatedly said that he was not a Communist. The article also made a key 
distinction regarding the nature of the country’s Communists by describing them as 
native products as opposed to Moscow-trained agents.181  
 The beachhead was a longer time in coming than the Los Angeles Times 
predicted, but the west coast paper jumped back into the breach. After publishing a 
relatively neutral article on May 3, Russell Fitzgibbon wrote two more accusatory stories 
on June 19 and June 23. In both pieces, he made the case for a Communist threat in 
Guatemala without directly accusing the government of being party to that danger. In his 
June 19 article, he wrote that “few responsible people charge that the government of 
Guatemala is Communist. It is equally clear, however, that Communists wield relatively 
more influence in Guatemala and do it more openly than in any other of the American 	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republics.” Although he included references to Ubico Castaneda’s harsh regime and the 
inequality of land distribution that Decree 900 aimed to remedy, those details appear as 
contextual window-dressing, given the articles’ headline: “Guatemala Is the Reds’ Strong 
Point in America.”182 His theme implied an organized Communist program to spread 
influence throughout the continent. Fitzgibbon’s June 23 article made a similar point 
about the influence of a few Communist schemers infecting the country. Again, he 
avoided accusing Arbenz Guzman’s government of Communist plotting while 
simultaneously making several such suggestions. Under the headline “How a Few 
Communists Manipulate Guatemala,” Fitzgibbon described local Communists’ political 
support for Arbenz Guzman and asserted that the land reform program was “made to 
order for the Communists.” Again avoiding direct allegations, Fitzgibbon concluded his 
piece with a rhetorical question: “Will Guatemala become the Western Hemisphere’s first 
satellite state?”183 Given the article’s content, the implied answer was that Guatemala was 
certainly headed that way. 
 Life submitted its first Guatemala-focused article in October, entitled: “The Red 
Outpost In Central America: Guatemala’s Communists thrive under fellow-traveler 
government.” The magazine did not call Arbenz Guzman or his government Communist, 
but clearly held a negative view of them. In addition to the accusatory headline, the 
article described Communists as “forever in need of something to hate,” and criticized 
Decree 900’s valuation of UFCO properties without mentioning that the figures were 
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based on UFCO’s own tax estimates.184 
 Aside from a Gruson article on the Guatemalan Army’s allegiance to Arbenz 
Guzman in early August, the New York Times’ Guatemala coverage was light until 
November 1953. On November 8, Gruson published another update on the Communist 
threat in Guatemala. Continuing the trend of his previous reporting, this article again 
warned of growing Red influence. Entitled “Guatemala Reds Increase Powers,” the 
column alleged an increase of Communist influence equivalent to dominating the 
government, and concluded that “President Arbenz Guzman has become a prisoner of the 
embrace he so long ago gave the Communists.”185 Gruson portrayed the regime in a 
slightly softer tone two days later, when he described Arbenz Guzman’s government as 
only “Red-Supported.” More significantly, this article marked the first reports of the U.S. 
government taking a harder line towards Arbenz Guzman. To this point, the United States 
had watched developments in Guatemala with a wary eye. Gruson’s article focused on 
the appointment of the avowed anti-Communist John Peurifoy to the position of U.S. 
Ambassador to Guatemala. Peurifoy had previously held a similar role in Greece, where 
he had established a reputation as an able Cold Warrior. As further proof of the U.S. 
move toward more aggressive measures, Gruson quoted a speech by Under-Secretary of 
State for Latin-American Affairs John Moors Cabot in which he declared that Guatemala 
“…was ‘playing the Russian game’ and would receive no economic aid from the United 
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States while it did.”186 
 The Los Angeles Times picked up the theme the following month, including 
Cabot’s statement along with Senator Alexander Wiley’s (R-Wis) accusation that 
“Communism has established a strong beachhead in Guatemala.” The bulk of the article 
discussed the USSR’s party organ Pravda, which had declared support for the 
Guatemalan government. Pravda may well have served to heighten Guatemalan fear of 
unwanted US attention rather than providing reassurance of Soviet support. Nonetheless, 
the article reported the common observation that “Arbenz, a leftist, and most of his 
government are not Communists but they insist that the Reds play a dominant role in the  
country.”187 The New York Times carried the same article on the same day, but added the 
prophetic passage, “Pravda predicted that ‘imperialists and their lackeys in Central 
America’ might make new efforts at ‘open intervention in Guatemala’ in the coming 
months.”188 
 Sydney Gruson continued his coverage of Communist influence in 1954. On 
January 3, he submitted a regional overview in which he noted that Guatemala was the 
only country in which Communism had made significant inroads. He predicted increasing 
Communist control, and charged that they had “no popular support,” but had 
“…succeeded in capturing the Administration.”189 
 The next month, Jules Dubois returned to the fray. Using characteristically blunt 	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language, his February 2 article was titled “Unions To Step Up Guatemalan Hate-U.S. 
Drive.”190 Several anti-American propaganda posters distributed by the Guatemalan 
General Confederation of Labor to various labor leaders at a conference had provoked 
Dubois’ ire. He then implicated Arbenz Guzman in the affair by reporting that the 
Communist Party’s manifesto called for increased support of the president. While his 
description of the manifesto’s contents was accurate, it enabled Dubois to continue his 
guilt-by-association efforts. 
 On February 7, Sydney Gruson reported that Guatemala City, the nation’s capital, 
had been enveloped by “an atmosphere of crisis,”191 and that the Communists had begun 
a drive to consolidate their power. The next significant report on Guatemala came from 
the Gruson family, but not Sydney. The 3-page report was filed by Gruson’s wife Flora 
Lewis, and was also the longest study of the country to date. The article was relatively 
neutral and historical in nature. In contrast to the insinuations of many previous reports, 
she addressed the issue of Soviet influence directly: “There is no reason to suppose that 
after hours of study in the Kremlin map room, some cold-eyed commissar waved away 
the rest of the hemisphere and pointed to Guatemala, saying, Ah, that is the place to 
start.” She went on to describe the various ways in which Arbenz Guzman was connected 
with the Communists, but concluded that it was primarily a marriage of convenience for 
Arbenz Guzman. Since Arbenz Guzman could use them to put his preferred programs in 
place, he was “willing to let them sing while they work.”192 Lewis’s report was countered 
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by another Times article the same day, under the headline “Guatemala Rally Reflects Red 
Grip: Party’s Tactics and Close Tie With Officials on View at Farm Workers’ 
Congress.”193 
 Lewis also wrote for the liberal magazine The Nation and submitted that 
publication’s first Guatemala-focused article on February 13. Perhaps due to the venue, 
she was less aggressive toward Arbenz Guzman and his government. She described 
Guatemala’s neighbors’ puzzlement over the United States’ myopic focus on the 
Communist issue; her headline read “The Peril Is Not Red In Central America.”194 
Arbenz Guzman, meanwhile, insisted that Communism in Guatemala was free of Soviet 
influence, and existed only as a part of a pluralistic democratic society. In his March 1, 
1954, Report to Congress, Arbenz Guzman asserted that “The Magna Carta of the 
Republic prohibits in a final manner all types of political discrimination,” including 
discrimination against Communists.195 
 Milton Bracker published a more detailed account of the Guatemalan 
government’s political leanings several weeks later in the Times. The article had an 
unusually large heading; one headline and three sub-headlines, all of which were 
somewhat alarming: “Guatemalan Reds Exploit Reforms; Utilize Agrarian Law in Effort 
to Build Up Peasant Force to Serve Communist Ends; Double Threat Is Posed; A 
Disruptive Internal Conflict and Provoking of Unilateral Act by U.S. Are Held Goals.” 
Bracker made two new and interesting accusations: first, that the agrarian committees in 	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charge of assigning new parcels of land under Decree 900 were possibly building up a 
peasant force that could be exploited by the Communists. His only evidence for this 
assertion was the wording of the oath a land recipient gave in order to receive his/her 
parcel: to defend it “with the flag in one hand and my arms in the other.” Bracker’s 
second submission raised the possibility of the Communists seeking to provoke a U.S. 
intervention. Although his evidence was purely circumstantial, such an argument helped 
insulate the United States from charges of imperialism. Bracker’s creative accusations 
aside, this article provides another example of sensationalist headlines trumping more 
nuanced text. Though one could hardly assume such an assertion from the headlines, 
Bracker’s first paragraph said that “The regime of President Jacobo Arbenz is neither 
Communist nor dominated by Communists.” Bracker also noted that land reform was 
overdue, and that the Communist threat was “not so much a security threat to the Panama 
Canal or a financial threat to private United States interests as it is a bustling outpost of 
Soviet propaganda right in the heart of the Americas.” Despite this moderate context, 
Bracker devoted his final paragraph to the customary charge that Guatemala was the 
subject of an “international Communist effort” to transform it into a thorn in the U.S.’s 
side.196 
 On May 17, the Swedish ship Alfhem arrived in Guatemala with a cargo of arms 
from the Soviet Union. After the United States had repeatedly refused to lift its embargo 
on his country, Arbenz Guzman desperately looked to the Soviets for weapons needed to 
supply and placate his army. The CIA confirmed the shipment, but Allen Dulles 	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conceded that there was “nothing illegal about what they are doing.”197 That inconvenient 
detail aside, he and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, set about fanning 
the American public’s fury. Despite various concerned and indignant opinions from US 
politicians, the mainstream media took less offense, at least initially. Gruson wrote an 
article (re-printed that day by the Los Angeles Times) accusing Washington of poor 
tactics and noted that “Friends and foes of the administration have closed ranks in support 
of the Government’s position that it had not only the right but the duty to buy arms 
wherever it could after the United States had refused to sell arms.” Gruson also discussed 
the critical Arbenz Guzman-Army relationship, and opined that the arms buy had pleased 
the army, and that its officers saw “no present danger from Communism in 
Guatemala.”198 
 Together with the press criticism of the U.S. response to the Alfhem incident, the 
drumbeat of concern continued unabated. The Los Angeles Times alone published six 
pieces on Guatemala from May 26-May 30, an unprecedented run. The first article 
charged that “Communism has taken a firm hold, which has been increasing of late….All 
of this goes to prove that the Communist movement that some observers either ignore, or 
try to minimize, is now known to operate on a full-time basis.”199  The second and third 
articles appeared on May 28. The former was a two-page piece by A.T. Steele, alleging 
an “Unsurpassed Example of Infiltration by Communist Party,” along with several 
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implications of Soviet support.200 The latter was notable primarily for the flimsiness of its 
source, a former Canadian Communist turned “professional anti-Communist” named Pat 
Walsh. Walsh’s credentials seemed to consist of only his vague profession and his 
testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Despite his 
thin resume and ability to offer no further context or evidence, the Times felt comfortable 
in printing his accusations that “International Communists, not native Communists, put 
the popular front government of Guatemala in power in 1950.” Walsh also cited a group 
of international citizens that were responsible for Guatemalan Communist Party actions, 
all working for the Russian Cominform.201 This kind of reporting was typically biased 
against the Guatemalan government, especially because it offered no context or balance 
to the allegations of one avowed anti-Communist activist.  
 In his fourth article, Steele alleged “the Communists are burrowing ever deeper 
into Guatemala’s government structure….There is little doubt that Guatemala is being 
used by nationalists and Communists as a base for intrigue.”202 However, like the bulk of 
his contemporaries, he stopped short of labeling the government or Arbenz Guzman as 
Communists. The fifth article was comparatively short and non-descript. It described 
Arbenz Guzman’s answers to a questionnaire provided by the Associated Press: a 
representative quote held that Guatemala was “interested in improving relations with the 
United States on the base of good understanding and mutual respect that should exist 
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between sovereign states.”203 Surprisingly, the Times printed his conciliatory answers 
without questioning his motivations or political leanings. Although Arbenz Guzman had 
tried to embrace friendly rhetoric, by May 1954 it was too little too late.  
 On May 30, 1954, Sydney Gruson noted the rising pressure in Guatemala, sub-
headlining his article “People Look for a Climax to End Crisis—Rumors Add to Mood of 
Nervousness.”204 Gruson mentioned the possibility of economic boycotts, an exile 
invasion, or even a landing of US troops to decide the matter.  This was a key distinction, 
since prior articles had discussed a need to “do something” without specifically including 
a physical intervention. Gruson did not suggest that intervention would be a good idea, 
and mentioned it only as a possibility. His article, published the same day, examined the 
rapidly evolving US policy toward Guatemala. He described the Soviet arms shipment as 
a catalyst for change, since it dramatically increased Guatemala’s military advantage over 
its neighbors.205 Gruson did not mention that many of the arms were rusty and outdated at 
the time, but reported those developments in a July 9, 1954 article.206 
 Russell Fitzgibbon of the Los Angeles Times attempted to decipher the rapidly 
shifting environment in Guatemala on May 31. Although he used the virus metaphor to 
describe the danger of Communism in Guatemala, his overarching tone was one of 
caution, not alarm: “At this stage the problem, which is the patient, needs psychiatric 
treatment rather than surgery. Let us hope this country is wise enough to recognize that 
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and strong enough to act upon it even if it calls for more patience and fewer scare 
headlines.”207 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not similarly inclined. The New 
York Times quoted him two weeks later as saying that the “Communist type of terrorism” 
in Guatemala was all that stood in the way of an indigenous coup.208 
 The Nation submitted an editorial on the subject as well. It criticized the 
government for exaggerating the Alfhem incident while noting that the State Department 
itself did not consider Guatemala a Communist country. It also pointed out the circuitous 
logic that characterized the US reaction to the arms shipment: “And so, obsessed with its 
role as boss-defender of the hemisphere, it refuses to sell arms to Guatemala, refuses to 
allow Guatemala to buy arms from friendly nations, and then denounces Guatemala as a 
threat to security when it gets arms where it can.”209 
 As unrest simmered in Guatemala, several articles looked back in search of its 
sources. A June 19 Los Angeles Times story traced the origins to the fall of Jorge Ubico 
Castaneda, followed by the assassination of Francisco Arana in 1950, and Arbenz 
Guzman allowing Communism to flourish.210 Jules Dubois argued that Arbenz Guzman 
took a more active role in the Communist Party, as evidenced by the headline, “How 
Arbenz Encouraged Reds.” Dubois charged Arbenz Guzman with a variety of sins, 
including being the handpicked candidate of the Communist party, echoing the 
Communist party line, backing a “hate America” campaign, sending officials to Moscow, 
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loaning government buildings to Communists for meetings, and being part of a clique 
that ordered Javier Arana’s assassination.211 
 With rumors of a coup abounding, commentators began to discuss the prospects 
of U.S. involvement in the uprising. The New York Times had published the contents of 
an Arbenz Guzman broadcast on June 20 in which he accused the United States of 
backing the coup.212 On June 21, Milton Bracker wrote a more detailed account of the 
U.S. government’s possible support or knowledge of the coup attempt. He stated it was 
“assumed in informed quarters that Washington was fully aware of the probable march of 
events in Guatemala” since the Alfhem arms shipment. Bracker also believed that the 
United States would be blamed for assisting the intervention regardless of its level of 
actual involvement, and turned responsibility toward Arbenz Guzman, who should have 
seen the intervention coming and changed his policies accordingly.213  
 The Los Angeles Times preferred to focus on Russian involvement. When Russia 
was the only nation to veto a UN motion to refer the Guatemalan coup to the 
Organization of American States, Times’ reporter Polyzoides (actual name unknown) 
regarded it as proof that the Soviets were working with Arbenz Guzman. Polyzoides 
accused the Soviets of “…starting other backfires right in the U.S. backyard,” while 
including only the official Washington version of the affair.214 The Times’ editorial board 
ran a similar accusation the same day, baldly asserting that the Russian veto proved that 
“the Communists are, in effect, running the Guatemalan government.” The board 	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evidently found U.S. claims of non-involvement more credulous than Soviet ones. The 
editorial rejected claims of U.S. involvement and argued that “to charge that we have a 
hand in it is almost certainly to exaggerate…it is highly unlikely anybody in the 
American government has made any moves to promote the Guatemalan revolt.”215 US 
officials did not find out until after the fact just how erroneous their assumptions were. 
Given that the U.S. government had long displayed its irritation with Arbenz Guzman 
and other media outlets had at least mentioned the possibility of U.S. involvement, the 
Times editorial board chose to ignore U.S. action against Arbenz Guzman. 
 In its first article on Arbenz Guzman’s Guatemala, The New Republic ran only a 
short piece on the issue and differed sharply from the majority of U.S. media opinions. 
Rather than accusing the Russians of meddling, the article compared Soviet attitudes 
about Guatemala to American attitudes about intervention in Korea and Indochina, since 
both the USSR and the U.S. were “vitally concerned with the protection of their 
respective and differing influences, anywhere.”216 
 The Times continued its series of broadly accusatory articles on June 27, this time 
in the form of an interview with Father Sebastian Buccellato, who had left Guatemala 
prior to the coup. Under the breathless headline “I Saw The Reds Taking Over!” the 
interview hammered home the theme of Soviet intrusion into Guatemala. The sub-
headline asserted that Guatemala had been turned into a “menacing Kremlin outpost,” 
and the priest described Guatemala as “indistinguishable from a Soviet satellite.” He 
concluded with the warning that, unless checked by citizens of bravery and conscience, 
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“we will one day soon see an Iron Curtain descend on the American continent.”217 
 By the time Father Buccellato’s interview hit the newsstands, the outcome of the 
revolt was no longer in doubt, as Arbenz Guzman resigned the next day, June 28. Many 
Latin American governments disagreed with the priest’s assessment of the situation in 
Guatemala and sided with Arbenz Guzman regardless of political inclination. The New 
York Times reported pro-Gutemalan demonstrations in Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay 
and Mexico, in addition to an official resolution of support from the Argentine Congress. 
The author did not accuse the US of providing material support to the revolt, but did 
allege tacit approval.218  
 The Nation was less conflicted over the meaning of the turmoil in Guatemala. J. 
Alvarez del Vayo denounced the violence as an “unwarranted attack against a small 
country, whose only crime has been to challenge, on behalf of its own national 
sovereignty, the sovereignty of a foreign private company and to run its internal affairs to 
suit itself.” Alvarez Del Vayo contributed an important piece of reporting that did not 
appear in any of the other outlets studied here. Referring to the New York Times’ piece 
that carried Secretary Dulles’ allegations of Communist terrorism, Alvarez del Vayo 
noted that the sources of the charges had been recanted by their originators. Guatemalan 
exiles in Mexico admitted forty-eight hours after the fact that their allegations were 
“grossly exaggerated.”219 Again, neither the sources of the report nor their withdrawal 
were addressed by the mainstream media outlets. 	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 On June 28, Arbenz Guzman resigned, and all three newspapers carried the event 
on their front pages. The Chicago Tribune’s headline read “President Arbenz of 
Guatemala Quits” and referenced Arbenz Guzman’s “pro-Communist government.”220 
The Los Angeles Times carried a more subdued headline: “Guatemala President Steps 
Down in New Move.” The attendant article described his Communist ties, but also 
pointed out that Arbenz Guzman himself was not a Communist.221 The New York Times’ 
headline read simply “Arbenz Is Deposed,” but did not reference Communism or 
Socialism in any form.222 
 Following Arbenz Guzman’s resignation, the press analyzed the aftermath and 
way forward. The Los Angeles Times’ editorial board seemed satisfied, writing that the 
“focus of Communist infection seems to have been wiped out.” In making their case, the 
editors omitted key details. Specifically, they alleged that the Alfhem shipment was a 
payoff for the land redistribution law, when in fact it was a desperation move to placate 
the army after the US had refused to fill the order.223 The Tribune’s editorial board was 
less sanguine, rejoicing in the removal of the “Communist stooge,” but warning that “the 
unrest which the Communists promoted in Guatemala will be quieted immediately.”224 
 Jules Dubois issued his own assessment several days later, celebrating the end of 
the “nightmare” of Communist rule in Guatemala while lauding the coup’s leader, 
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Colonel Castillo Armas. In a concluding bit of creative license, he described the revolt as 
a great victory for a population that was “99 per cent anti-Communist” --a doubtlessly 
exaggerated figure, but a detail that was characteristic of his reporting.225 The New York 
Times described Armas as “unquestionably a patriot and a man of deep-seated anti-
Communist convictions.”226 
 Russell Fitzgibbon was also pleased with the coup, with the Los Angeles Times 
headlining his article “Anti-Red Victory Is Model for U.S. Policy.” He approved of 
indirect U.S. support, preferring that method to belligerent rhetoric and unilateral military 
interventions. Interestingly, he also asserted that “It was widely assumed that the United 
States was giving moral and perhaps material support to the invaders.”227 When the 
assumption had been mentioned before the intervention, it was rejected by Fitzgibbon’s 
own editorial board. 
 Major newsmagazines also ran prominent stories on the coup. Life’s lead story 
was revealingly entitled “A Guatemalan Revolution That Everybody Expected.” Life also 
ran twice as many large pictures as paragraphs (6 to 3), and described the former 
government as “notoriously pro-Communist.”228 Time provided a much more substantive 
story, and featured Arbenz Guzman’s visage on that week’s cover. The article placed 
blame for the coup squarely on Arbenz Guzman and his administration, and dismissed the 
“Communist-line” government’s accurate accusations of US involvement. The piece also 
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blamed Arbenz Guzman personally, claiming he had started the trouble by “flinging wide 
the palace doors and welcoming Communists into his government.” Time apparently 
assumed that even if the U.S. was not involved in the coup, it would have been justified 
in doing so on that basis alone. The article discussed Arbenz Guzman’s biography at 
length, noting his scholastic accomplishments (including historically high grades at the 
country’s military academy). But when examining his political philosophy and warming 
to Communist ideas, the article described him as “no heavyweight thinker.” It is 
unknown if this was intended to show that Arbenz Guzman was fooled into following the 
ideology, but there is clearly a negative implication. Although the article accurately 
described the lack of Communists in official positions, it accused them of having undue 
influence is Arbenz Guzman’s government. It also asserted that the Alfhem incident and 
the arms imports made war inevitable. Unsurprisingly, there was no mention of Arbenz 
Guzman’s pleading for US arms beforehand: “Guatemala’s explosive purchase of Red 
arms in such quantity made the Kremlin’s tampering fingers visible to the most 
myopic.”229 
 After Arbenz Guzman’s resignation, debate continued over its meaning and 
effects. In another piece of analysis in The Nation, J.A. del Vayo accused the United 
States of cynically backing the invasion while condemning China for selling arms to the 
Vietminh. Alvarez Del Vayo imagined Secretary Dulles logic as: “We are not opposed to 
the overthrow of legally constituted governments. We are only against it when the 
overthrowers are Communists.”230 Nonetheless, he did not directly accuse the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Unknown Author, “Guatemala: Battle of the Backyard,” Time, June 28, 1954. 
230 J.A. del Vayo, “War Against The UN: The Guatemala Chapter,” The Nation, July 3, 
1954, 3-4. 
	  	   80	  
States of financing or supplying the coup. Life adopted the opposite perspective by 
accusing Communists of trying to pin the war on the U.S. and using the conflict to 
advance its cause.231 Time struck a more neutral stance, publishing Arbenz Guzman’s 
farewell address but accusing his regime of slowly moving towards Soviet orbit and 
citing Arbenz’s alleged “Marxism.”232 
 The analysis continued in the next week’s editions. Freda Kirchney of The Nation 
noted Arbenz Guzman’s accusation that American newspapers had helped instigate the 
fury against his government, as well as the United States’ flawed logic on the Alfhem 
issue. The Nation ran three similar articles over the next month as well.233 Kirchney 
raised the question of, but did not accuse, the United States of direct involvement. Time 
raised similar concerns, noting that Castillo Armas’s bases in Honduras could have been 
stopped with a U.S. “frown.”234 Life ran a small article that included ten pro-rebel 
photographs. 235 
 The New Republic waited until July 19 to run a significant feature; its cover story 
was entitled “Perspective On Guatemala.” As the headline indicates, the article featured 
several sides of the argument. It highlighted the necessity of land reform, the importance 
of native Indians achieving political representation, press freedom enjoyed under Arbenz 
Guzman’s administration, and the danger of Communist intervention.236 
 During the run-up to PBSUCCESS, few mainstream publications suspected 
behind-the-scenes U.S. involvement. Although the Washington Post did not link the CIA 	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to Guatemala in its June 1954 editions, the New York Times published several features 
accusing the United States of at least tacit approval. The Times actually mentioned CIA 
chief Allen Dulles in relation to the Guatemalan unrest, and due to its wide readership on 
Capitol Hill the CIA's involvement was a poorly kept secret. Nonetheless, both papers’ 
editorial columns backed the general idea that the Kremlin was interfering in Guatemala, 
and that something should be done to counteract it. The Times even kept their Mexico 
City-based reporter Sydney Gruson out of Guatemala at the behest of Allen Dulles.237 In 
the end though, every mainstream outlet, whether liberal or conservative, dismissed the 
charge that the U.S. had been plotting against Arbenz Guzman; even The Nation 
remained silent on the issue.238 
 Overall, the evidence suggests that mainstream U.S. print media outlets generally 
exhibited a pro-U.S., anti-Communist bias. Accusations of Communism and Soviet 
influence appeared far more frequently than the solid evidence needed to support them. 
Mainstream media outlets frequently told only the U.S. side of the story and did not 
report relevant details that would have balanced the readers’ view. There is little evidence 
to suggest a large-scale government effort to directly manipulate the mainstream press in 
favor of intervention. There are only two solid pieces of evidence to support such an 
assertion. The first comes from a 1957 Time article. In it, the author discusses Jules 
Dubois, the Tribune reporter who penned the most vehement accusations against Arbenz 
Guzman and his government. He and Castillo Armas were old friends, dating from when 
Castillo Armas studied under Dubois at the U.S. Army’s command and general and staff 
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school during World War II.239 In and of itself, this report could be dismissed as a mere 
coincidence. However, more substantive information appearing several decades later 
reinforced the possibility of Dubois’ calculated bias. A 1977 New York Times article 
reported the CIA’s links with domestic and international journalists, including the 
eyebrow-raising note that twenty-two American media organizations had employed 
journalists who were also working for the CIA. The noted Cold Warrior Jules Dubois was 
identified as “an ‘asset’…the late Latin American correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, 
described by one former official as ‘well and favorably known; to the agency though 
never on the payroll.”240 He was not alone, since most CIA-media personnel began as 
journalists and volunteered their services to the CIA.241 Dubois’ loyalties 
notwithstanding, he represented only a slightly more aggressive viewpoint in mainstream 
American journalism. The central anti-Communist sentiment remained. 
 Although the aforementioned publications varied ideologically, the types of 
reporting exhibited were primarily a matter of degree rather than a genuine difference of 
opinion. Except for The Nation, all shared the conviction that Arbenz Guzman was a 
dangerous character who posed a Communist threat to the region. Jules Dubois was more 
strident in his criticism, but it was simply a matter of using harsher words to express the 
same sentiment.  
 As the largest producer of Guatemala reporting in the period, the New York Times 
represented the most important data set. Despite its liberal reputation, the paper’s 
reporting on Arbenz Guzman’s regime maintained a steadily skeptical tone. There were a 	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smattering of sympathetic passages among the hundreds of articles produced, but overall 
the Times adopted the traditional anti-Communist perspective. This is a key detail, 
because many journalists and government officials regarded the Times as the premier 
newspaper in the country. Therefore, if a given Times article evinced an anti-Communist 
point of view, that perspective would be replicated throughout the country’s newspapers 
and readership.  
 The nature of journalism in the 1950s virtually required that media coverage of 
any Communist-related matter be slanted heavily to the right. The U.S. government 
maintained a steadfast anti-Communist stance, many of the largest media moguls (most 
notably Henry Luce) were avowed anti-Communists, many of their reporters had served 
in the military or worked as government propagandists during World War II, and the 
audience which they served was overwhelmingly anti-Communist. In an environment 
where anti-Communist information was considered true and right, and any notion to the 
contrary elicited deep skepticism, even hostility, the avalanche of accusations against 
Arbenz Guzman was the norm for leaders that did not conform to the United States’ 
belief system, regardless of the veracity of the accusations. 
 It should be remembered that, political bias and opinion aside, profitability was a 
key driver for what newspapers printed and when. Like any organism, the first 
responsibility of a business is to survive. Although newspapers are businesses that ideally 
serve the public good, they are businesses nonetheless. If they were not so, Joseph 
Pulitzer II (publisher of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch) would not have instructed his 
reporters to treat Joe McCarthy fairly and generously because the paper's readership 
generally shared McCarthy's anti-Communist sentiments. Even with the growth of 
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interpretive journalism after World War II, its ratio compared to the amount of 
advertising content dropped from 60:40 to 40:60 after the war, so publishers could keep 
pace with increased overhead.242 Given increased costs, media sponsors’ opinions 
became more important. Quite simply, sponsors and advertisers did not want to risk 
dollars on politically unsafe products, and shied away from programs and articles that 
questioned the rapid build-up of the national security state.243 Therefore, we must 
consider the impact of popularity, or the instinct of a newspaper to avoid directly 
challenging popular ideas and notions, regardless of their basis in fact, in order to 
maintain its readership.  
 In hindsight, PBSUCCESS has lost its luster. CIA agent Richard Bissell, who 
helped engineer the coup, later noted “I would be surprised if there was anyone at Opa 
Locka-or even the CIA Washington headquarters of PBSuccess-who had a thoughtful 
understanding of what was going on in Guatemala.” The CIA’s successes in Iran and 
Guatemala led later presidents to overestimate its capabilities, which led (in part) to the 
ill-fated operations in the Bay of Pigs. Guatemala itself suffered a series of revolutions 
and counter-revolutions, leaving a trail of poverty and unrest in which over 100,000 
died.244 
 Contrary to the old adage, the failings of the U.S. government and the U.S. media 
had many fathers. The U.S. government maintained a policy of anti-Communism, and 
produced propaganda to support that viewpoint. The American people were instructed to 
be fearful of Communism, as were most journalists. The journalists themselves had often 
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worked as propagandists and reporters, sometimes mixing the two. From that citizenry 
sprung an eagerness to counter Communism aggressively in even the most innocuous of 
countries. Newspapers and magazines believed in the Communist threat, and pleased 
their readership with reporting that fit that narrative. Fear led to alarmist warnings and 
overreactions. Government officials were subject to those same influences, and attempted 
to shape media coverage to fit a narrative of ever-increasing Communist threat in 
Guatemala. Examples of direct intervention were few, but also unnecessary. Journalists 
often covered what the government said without challenging the facts, and relied on 
suspicious accusations to fill in the blanks. In such an environment, fair reporting and 
reasonable discourse about the fate of Guatemala became impossible. The simple norm of 
anti-Communism drove U.S. domestic and foreign policy, and the assumed inherent 
rightness of the U.S. government’s perspective fundamentally slanted the reporting on 
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